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Introduction
Fear and love of the Internet have been strange bedfellows since
the beginning, each growing in leaps and bounds to match pace with

the other. The introverted heroine played by Sandra Bullock in the
film, "The Net,"' is victimized by her use of and attachment to the
Internet, which allows anarchist computerphobes to erase her life and
identity electronically.2 At the same time, affinity for the Internet has
been exploding, with the Internet more than tripling in size in the
3
space of two years.

While the fears of potential hazards of the Internet are largely
exaggerated by media portrayal,4 one of the genuine pitfalls of the

Internet is one accompanying any mode of communication-its
potential to be used to transmit offensive and/or undesired expression.
In the context of educational institutions, which constitute the second
largest segment of the Internet,5 this has been a particular problem.6
Accordingly, schools have taken sometimes extraordinary steps to

prevent or react to such problems.
For example, in March 1998, sixteen-year-old Ohio high school
student Sean O'Brien created a Web site to complain about his high7
school band teacher, Raymond Walczuk, at www.raymondsucks.org.
1. The terms "Net" is commonly used short forms of "Internet." Cf AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1214 (3d ed. 1992) (defining
"network").
2. THE NET (Columbia Pictures 1995). Cf LAWNMOWER MAN (New Line Cinema
1992); LAWNMOWER MAN II: BEYOND CYBERSPACE (New Line Cinema 1996) (both
depicting a villain who stands to dominate the world by becoming "one" with cyberspace,
thereby becoming able to control all activities currently run by computers).
3. Cynthia Bournellis, Internet '95, INTERNET WORLD, November 1995, at 47. The
size of the noncorporeal and amorphous Internet is an abstraction, at best. Size here was
measured by counting the number of registered host computers connected to the Internet.
Id. See also discussion infra Part I.A-B.
4. Robert Geiger, Don't Let FearRule the Internet,S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 13, 1995, at
B5.
5. Bournellis, supra note 3, at 47. The educational domain has been growing at
extraordinary rates, mirroring what is going on with the rest of the Internet; it grew from
856,243 hosts in July 1994 to 1.4 million in July 1995. Id.
6. See, e.g., Serge F. Kovaleski, Profusion of Electronic Hate Mail Puts Schools in a
Bind, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1995, at C1.
7. See
Freedom
of
Speech
Live
(visited
Apr.
17,
1998)
<http://www.raymondsucks.org>; John Affleck, Student Wins Court Order Protecting
Internet
Site
Critical
of
Teacher
(visited
Apr.
17,
1998)
<http://www.foxnews.com/news/wires2/0319/nap_0319_426.sml>;
Student Wins Court
Order Protecting Internet Site, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at 17; Evelyn Theiss
& Kevin Harter, Access to Web Lifts Lid from Student Expression, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Mar. 21, 1998, at 1B; Jewell Cardwell, This Problem Has a Remedy Right at Home,
BEACON, Mar. 21, 1998, at Cl; Banned Student Targets School's Band Director, BEACON,
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The Web site featured a photograph of Walczuk, described him as "an
overweight middle-aged man who doesn't like haircuts," characterized
him as a busybody who "likes to involve himself in everything you do,
demands that band be your No. 1 priority, and favors people," and
listed Walczuk's home address and telephone number.' School
administrators recommended expelling O'Brien, but the school
district overseeing O'Brien's school opted to suspend him for ten
days. 9 O'Brien sued successfully for reinstatement, obtaining an
injunction against the school.' °
Similarly, Texas middle schooler Aaron Smith created a Web site
for "the Chihuahua Haters of the World," featuring shared stories
about hating the dogs, such as one in which a seven-foot boa
constrictor eats one." The Web site mentioned it was created in the
school computer lab. 2 The school officials of the middle school
suspended him for one day and removed him from his computer lab
class. 13 Smith sued, though he and the school settled the matter short
of trial with Smith returning to the computer lab class and no mention
of the incident on his scholastic record.1 4
In Fall 1996, Princeton University effected a blanket prohibition
of its students' and staff's use of the Internet for "political
purposes."' 15 The ACLU urged Princeton University to end this
Mar. 20, 1998, at B2; CybercriticalTeen Back in Classroom, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20,
1998, at 32.
8. See, e.g., Affleck, supra note 7; Cardwell, supra note 7, at Cl; Banned Student
Targets School's Band Director,supra note 7, at B2.
9. See, e.g., Banned Student Targets School's Band Director,supra note 7, at B2.
10. See, e.g., Affleck, supra note 7; Student Wins Court Order Protecting Internet Site,
supra note 7 at 17; Theiss & Harter, supra note 7, at 1B; Banned Student Targets School's
Band Director,supra note 7, at B2; CybercriticalTeen Back in Classroom, supra note 7, at
32. O'Brien also instituted a civil suit seeking $550,000 in damages, which he settled for
$30,000. Kid Wins Round in Clash over Web Page (visited Apr. 17, 1998)
<http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/11075.html>; Cleveland Student to Get
$30,000 in Web Site Flap, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 1998, at A12; Mark Rollenhagen,
Westlake Schools to Pay $30,000 to Settle Net Suit, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 14,1998, at IA.
The O'Brien case seems to be the only civil suit on censored student speech on the
Internet to reach a judgment (in the form of an injunction). See Banned Student Targets
School's Band Director, supra note 7, at B2 (attorneys for O'Brien and the executive
director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio said "they believe the case is the
first of its kind regarding a student's free-speech rights on the Internet"); see also Student
Wins Court Order Protecting InternetSite Criticalof Teacher, supra note 7.
11. Theiss & Harter,,supranote 7, at lB.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Princeton University Revokes Ban on Political Speech (visited Sept. 18, 1996)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/updates/upseptb.html#prince>.
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policy.16 Finally, Princeton relented and stated, "It is not Princeton's

policy to prohibit individual members of the university community
from using Princeton's computer network for personal political
discourse."17
In Fall 1995, a Virginia Tech student posted a message calling for
gays to be castrated and to "die a slow death" on a gay men's Internet
site titled, "Out and Proud., 18 The university punished the student but
refused to release the details of the sanctions imposed.19
At about the same time, four freshmen at Cornell University sent

an e-mail message listing "75 reasons why women should not have
freedom of speech" to about twenty of their friends; the message was
forwarded, almost like a chain letter, to countless people across the
country. It included lines such as, "If she can't speak, she can't cry
rape," and, "Of course, if she can't speak, she can't say no," and vulgar
references to oral sex.2" Cornell was bombarded with public outrage in
the form of so many complaining e-mails that its computer system
crashed.2 1 The four students apologized and expressed "deep

remorse" for their 22"stupid actions" in a letter printed in Cornell's
student newspaper.

16. Id.; Letter from Ann Beeson, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union, and
David Rocah, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, to Howard S.
Ende, Office of General Counsel, Princeton University (Aug. 23, 1996) (reprinted at
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/princelet2.html>); Letter from Ann Beeson, Staff
Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union, and David Rocah, Staff Attorney, American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, to Howard S. Ende, Office of General Counsel,
at
15;
1996)
(reprinted
(Aug.
Princeton
University
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/ princelet.html>).
17. Princeton University Revokes Ban on Political Speech, supra note 15 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
18. Michael D. Shear, Free Speech Gets Tangled in the 'Net, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
1995, at Al.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., E-mail Mischief Gets Cornell in Instant Trouble, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 15,
1995, at A5.
21. Marco R. della Cava et al., Cornell Punishes Misogynist E-mail, USA TODAY,
Nov. 21, 1995, at 6D. David Lambert, the university vice-president, reported receiving
nearly 1000 e-mail complaints before he stopped reading them, and the four students
reported receiving fifty to sixty "threatening responses" per week. See E-mail Mischief
Gets Cornell in Instant Trouble, supra note 20, at A5.People did speak on behalf of the
students, raising First Amendment concerns. See della Cava et al., supra note 21, at 6D;
Letter from Robert B. Chatelle, Political Issues Chair, National Writers Union, to Barbara
Krause, Judicial Administrator, Cornell University (Nov. 19, 1995) (visited Dec. 29, 1996)
<http://world.std.com:80/-kip/cornell.html>.
22. della Cava et al., supra note 21, at 6D.
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The university charged the students with sexual harassment and
misuse of computer resources. 23 While the disciplinary board
ostensibly decided not to punish the students, 24 the students agreed to
attend Cornell's "Sex at 7" program, which deals with acquaintance
rape; perform of 50 hours of community service, if possible at a
nonprofit agency focusing on sexual assault or similar issues; and meet
25
with a group of Cornell senior administrators to apologize.
In Spring 1995, seventeen-year-old high school student Paul Kim
created a satirical "Unofficial Newport High School Home Page" and

posted it publicly on the Internet.26 On the page, Kim poked fun at his
27
peers for being "preoccupied by sex and for majoring in football.,
The page also included links that could bring an observer of the page
to other pages on the Internet, in particular, ones with material about
28
oral sex and masturbation and a picture of a Playboy centerfold.
Upon discovering the page, Newport High School administrators
withdrew the school's support for Kim's National Merit finalist
candidacy and endorsement of their letters of recommendation to
seven universities to which he had applied, including Harvard,

Stanford, and Columbia, without notifying Kim. 29 Kim had earned a
3.88 GPA through high school 30 and was popular among and wellliked by his teachers. 31 Fortunately for Kim, the American Civil

Liberties Union stepped in on his behalf and threatened to sue the
23. E-mail Mischief Gets Cornell in Instant Trouble, supranote 20, at A5.
24. Nancy Garland, Student penalizedfor online threats UM teen-agerfaces community
service, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, ME., Oct. 30, 1997. Interestingly, the title of a USA Today
article characterized this "agreement" more as disciplinary measures handed down by the
university. See della Cava et al., supranote 21, at 6D.
25. della Cava et al., supra note 21, at 6D.
26. Internet Sex Note Hurts College Hunt (visited Dec. 29, 1996)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Censorship/Academicedu/school-censorship.article> (from the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer);Andrea F. Vitale, Beware of Your Home Page! (visited Dec. 29,
1996) <http://www.ecnet.net:80/users/muamv2/kim.htm>; Rose Aguilar, Student Wins Net
Free
Speech
Case
(visited
Dec.
29,
1995)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,297,00.html>.
27. See Claire Cooper, School Discipline Going Off Campus, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 28, 1998, at Al.
28. See Free Speech on Internet is Upheld for Student, AUSTIN AMERICAN
STATESMAN, Dec. 24, 1995, at A4 (citations omitted).
29. See Settlement: Student Wrongly Scolded for Ridiculing High School on Internet,
THE STATE J. -REG. SPRINGFIELD ILL.; Dec. 24, 1995, at 5 (citations omitted).

30. See Keiko Saukura, Settlement Reached in Internet Case: Paul Kim Gets His Say,
NORTHWEST ASIAN WEEKLY, Jan. 5, 1996, at 4.

31. See Internet Sex Note Hurts College Hunt, supra note 26 (twelve teachers signed a
letter to prompt the administration to reconsider its actions; English teacher Janet
Sutherland said she was "very upset" at the turn of events and described Kim as
"brilliant.").
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school.32 The matter was settled out of court, with the Bellevue School
District issuing a formal apology to Kim, paying Kim for the value of
the potentially lost National Merit scholarship, and reinstating Kim as
a National Merit finalist.3 3

In 1993, a University of Texas at Dallas student made a series of
postings on Russian and Ukrainian politics. In so doing, he made
liberal use of terms such as "holhol," which many Ukrainians consider

to be a racial epithet, compared the Ukrainian national symbol, the
trident, to a sexual device, and implied a homosexual relationship
between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukraine President
Leonid Kravchuk. The university revoked his Internet connection.

The student filed a lawsuit against the university charging violation of
his rights of free speech.34

Perhaps the most notoriety has been afforded Jake Baker, a
student at the University of Michigan who posted a perverse sexual
fantasy describing the abduction, rape, and torture of a woman,

named after a classmate, and exchanged e-mails with a man in Ontario
about such topics. 35 The university first took away his computer
privileges. It then asked him to withdraw voluntarily from the
university though he could return at a later date, if he got "help." 36 He
was never given a chance to make that decision. On February 2, 1995,
armed University of Michigan officers presented him with a letter
from the university President authorizing his suspension and removed

him from campus. 37 On February 9, FBI agents arrested Baker and
32. Cooper, supra note 27, at Al.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Lawsuit Seeking Limits of Computer Free Speech, HOUSTON CHRON.,
November 15, 1993, at 16. The suit was subsequently dismissed by U.S. District Court
Judge Jorge A. Solis, who found that "Mr. Steshenko's use of the Net strayed from any
possible academic purpose." Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, North Texas Free Net, and Other
Wandering, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 28,1994, at 2F.
35. See, e.g., Robert Davis, Graphic 'Cyber-Threats' Land Student in Court, USA
TODAY, Feb. 10, 1995. The story of this student, Jake Baker, was widely reported by the
Associated Press and a host of other newspapers and television news media. See, e.g.,
Brenda Ingersoll et al., Cyber Fantasy or Real-Life Threat? Smart, SophisticatedJake Baker
Always Stood Out, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 12, 1995, at Al; CBS Evening News: Jake Baker
Arrested by the FBIfor Writing Sadistic Messages on the Internet(CBS television broadcast,
Feb. 11, 1995); Brian S. Akre, Student Jailedfor Internet Torture Tale, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 10, 1995; Student Charged For Sending Internet Messages on Torture Slaying,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 9, 1995; see generally Jake Baker Information Page (visited Dec.
29,
1996)
<http://www.mit.edu/activities/
safe/safe/cases/umich-bakerstory/Baker/JakeBaker.html>.
36. Megan Garvey, Crossing the Line on the Info Highway: He Put His Ugly Fantasy
on the Internet. Then He Ran Smack into Reality, WASH. POST, March 11, 1995, at H1.
37. Id.
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charged him with transmitting threatening communications across
state lines.38 The charges were dismissed,39 but the United States
Attorney's Office announced it would appeal.4 °
In every one of these cases the Universities have been accused of

overstepping the First Amendment's protection of expressive speech.
As Michael Froomkin, an associate law professor at the University of
Miami, puts it, "Most universities err wildly, and in many cases,

illegally on the side of control, and they give the users no rights at
all.",41 Likewise, Ann Beeson, an attorney with the American Civil
Liberties Union, notes the disturbing "trend where the first instinct of
the school is to censor the speech."42
How much legal authority do educational institutions really have

in these situations? This seemingly simple question sits at the
crossroads of general First Amendment jurisprudence, the context of
the school as it affects constitutional and other law, and the Internet as
a medium of communication. Each of these prongs is itself
convoluted, somewhat unsettled, and often misunderstood. The
question being thus triply complicated, it is no wonder that schools
38. Id.
39. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
40. David Josar, U.S. Ready to Charge Student Again, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 17, 1995,
at C3.
41. Shear, supra note 18. The federal government may be following suit, according to
some opinions. The House-Senate conference committee on telecommunications approved
an extremely restrictive bill on Internet speech that would prohibit indecent speech on the
Internet by way of six-figure fines and jail terms. Steven Levy, The Year of the Internet,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 1995/Jan. 1, 1996 (Special Double Issue, "1995 in Cartoons"), at 28.
Many groups and individuals are fighting the bill and asserting that it is an unconstitutional
infringement on First Amendment protections. Id. The bill passed and became known as
the Communications Decency Act in February 1996. Bill Pietrucha, ACLU Files
Communications Decency Act Brief with Supreme Court, NEWSBYTES, Feb. 20, 1997
(available at <http://www.newsbytes.com/ news/97/86225.html>). This prompted continued
outrage, protest, lawsuits, and even cries of civil disobedience. See Amy Harmon, Civil
Disobedience Online? Net Users Defy Censorship, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 18, 1995,
at A7. In 1996, a United States District Court held the Act unconstitutional. See Robert
Gebeloff, Computer Porn Defies Controls, THE REC., Feb. 12, 1997, at Al. The Third
Circuit affirmed. John Seiler, Liberty Online, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 26, 1997, at G1.
The government is appealing. See Gebeloff, supra, at Al; see also Justice DepartmentBrief
Staunchly Defends CDA, MULTIMEDIA MONITOR, Feb. 1, 1997, available in WESTLAW,
1997 WL 9721672.
States, too, are enacting laws against transmitting "indecent" materials to youth over
the Internet. See MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIST, Sept. 1996, at 5. The list of states currently
includes New York, Georgia, Virginia, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, and
Maryland. Id. As some of the state laws were promulgated after the CDA encountered
difficulties, they were written with CDA's constitutional problems in mind; thus, some of
them may survive constitutional scrutiny. See id.
42. Theiss & Harter, supra note 7.

1998]

TYPE No EVIL

appear to act blindly and rashly, without regard to student rights.
After all, what are the student
rights? Thus far, there has been no
43
court opinion to guide analysis.
This Comment attempts to distill the proper legal standards to be
applied to restrictions placed by educational institutions on various
types of Internet expressions by their students. This Comment
confines itself specifically
to the expression 44 of students 45 in public
46
educational institutions.
43. The O'Brien case mentioned above seems to be the first and only even to reach
judgment. See discussion supra note 10. However, it apparently did not yield an opinion;
my searches of LEXIS failed to reveal anything but news articles on the case, and I was
unsuccessful in reaching O'Brien and/or his attorneys to verify there had been no opinion
issued.
44. I limit discussion to proactive expression, that is, the right to "speak" rather than
the right to receive information. The latter is also subsumed in First Amendment
protections. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (students have a "right to
receive information and ideas"); Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is
the right of the viewers and listeners ...

which is paramount ....

It is the purpose of the

First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas .... "); Fox v. Board of
Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y., 841 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1988) ("One of the
constitutional rights enjoyed by students, of course, must be the right to receive
information."). It also raises particular concerns with regard to the Internet in schools. For
example, in 1994, Carnegie Mellon University restricted school Internet accounts so they
could no longer access certain newsgroups containing sexually explicit materials. See, e.g.,
Declan B. McCullagh, It's About Cyberfreedom: Central to Launching the Internet, CMU
Must be a Free-Speech Absolutist on its Use, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 1994,
at B3; ACLU Urges Carnegie Mellon To Reverse Internet Censorship; Letter to University
President Says Students Must Have Access to Information (visited Dec. 29, 1996)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/ censor/cyber2.html>; cf also, Loving v. Boren, No. 976086 (10th Cir., Jan. 7, 1998) (professor sought to sue over university policy denying access
to certain Internet newsgroups); ACLU, ACLU Enters VA Library Internet Lawsuit on
Behalf
of
Online
Speakers
(visited
Apr.
17,
1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/n020698a.html>; L. A. Lorek & Patricia Horn, Free-Speech
Issue Lurks Behind Bill to FilterInternet Smut in Schools, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 16, 1998, at
1G (discussing bill to limit access to certain Internet sites); Natalie Patton, College Student,
23, Chased Off Internet While Looking at Nudes, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Dec. 5, 1997, at 1B
(photography student viewing Internet art gallery, including nude photos, asked to leave
computer lab); Peter H. Lewis, Group Pushes to Keep Racism Off the Net, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 10, 1996, at Al (Jewish human rights group asks universities to refuse to carry racist
materials); John Markoff, On-Line Service Blocks Access To Topics Called Pornographic,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at Al (Compuserve Internet service provider blocks access by
subscribers to "more than 200 sexually explicit computer discussion groups and picture
data bases.").
45. Many of the same concerns and law that apply to students will also apply to
faculty and staff. However, as employees of the educational institution, the expression of
faculty and staff raise some additional issues that play out somewhat differently. For
example, how a teacher's expression affects her teaching efficiency in the classroom may
be a valid consideration that is not present for students. See generally Donna Prokop,
Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between First Amendment Rights and
Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533 (1993). To the extent such academic
freedom issues are raised for students, this Comment does attempt to address them.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[VOL. 20:751

Part I of this Comment provides a factual framework by
discussing the relationships between and among public schools,
students, and the Internet. Part II outlines how First Amendment
cases have played out in the context of schools. In the broad scheme of
First Amendment jurisprudence, public schools have broad power to
regulate students qua students. Thus, in particular, Part II explores
how to determine what can be categorized as a valid regulation of
students qua students, drawing from cases and commentary. This
determination turns on how a regulation at issue furthers the school's
educational mission.
Part III examines the cases in which school actions do not fall
under their power to regulate students qua students, thus triggering a
more "standard" First Amendment analysis. In that analysis, the
context of the Internet is the novelty. Part III first argues that the
power and capabilities of the Internet do not justify treating it as
qualitatively different than other media of communication, and then
looks at how "standard" First Amendment doctrines such as "public
forum" analysis apply to Internet communications.
Part IV attempts to extract the relevant and most useful legal
standards from Parts II and III to develop an approach to analyzing a
public school regulation or action that restricts student Internet
expression. Finally, Part V illustrates this approach by applying it to
three case examples and by its conclusions suggesting that certain
restrictive measures being implemented by schools are likely
unjustified and illegal.

See discussion infra Part II.C.
46. Private educational institutions are not bound by the First Amendment, making
discussion of their ability to restrict expression somewhat purposeless. See, e.g., Lloyd v.
Tanner Corp., 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) ("First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the
rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner
of private property.
... [emphasis in original]). However, state legislation can extend
certain rights of freedom of expression to private educational institution contexts. In
California, the so-called "Leonard Law" dictates that a private university student has the

same right to free speech on campus as she enjoys off campus. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367
(West 1997). California seems to be the only state with such a law. See Kathy Barrett
Carter, Appeals Court Upholds Expulsions for E-mail Slurs at Private School, THE STARLEDGER, Aug. 16,1995, availablein WESTLAW, 1995 WL 8872232.
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I

Framing the Problem: The Internet in Schools
A. The Nature of the Internet
As Newsweek flamboyantly proclaimed in a subtitle spanning
four pages in its year-end article on the Internet, "This Changes...
Everything."4 7 But why? What is the Internet, what can it do, and how
does it differ from other contexts?
The Internet is often romanticized as a "place," occupying
physical space. People "surf" the 'Net and the Web 48 and speak of
visiting "sites." These physical metaphors were at least in part
originated by the term, "cyberspace," which was coined in an awardwinning novel about a not-so-distant future in which computer
49
cowboys interfaced directly with computers and enter "cyberspace.,
The reality of cyberspace may be drawing closer as we speak.
50
In less romantic terms, the Internet is a network of networks.
Each network is a "system of computers interconnected by telephone
wires or other means in order to share information." 51 The backbone
that connects these networks to each other are high-speed lines
originally designed to connect the National Science Foundation
supercomputers. 52 These lines consist of high-capacity telephone links,
microwaves, lasers, fiber optics, and satellites. 53 In sum, the Internet
connects computers all over the world and is thus often called the
54
"Global" Internet.
A person accesses the Internet via a computer directly connected
to (or which is part of) the Internet, often called a "host" computer.5 5
47. Levy, supra note 41, at 22-25.
48. "Web" and "WWW" are commonly used short terms for "World Wide Web,"
which is, in some senses, a subset of the Internet. See discussion infra this section.
49. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984).
50. See, e.g., JOSHUA EDDINGS, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS (1994).
51. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1214 (3d ed.,
1992) (computer science definition of "network"). See also Panel's CDA Ruling Yields
Authoritative Definition of the Internet, MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIST, June 1996, at 1
(discussing American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, Civil Action No. 96-963, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7919 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1996)).
52. Levy, supra note 41, at 9.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., id., at 9; DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 73 (1995).
55. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 41, at 21; COMER, supra note 54, at 129 n.t. It is also
called a "server." E.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 90 [hereinafter "NII
REPORT"]. The NII REPORT has also been coined the "White Paper."
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However, more commonly, she uses a computer connected to a host,
or a computer even further removed from the direct connection to the
Internet.56 These degrees of separation are often navigated by highspeed computers and the aforementioned high-speed lines, making the
separation almost invisible. Once connected to the Internet, the
computer user may then send or retrieve information through the
Internet. Depending on the interface she has, composed of the
computer and the software program it runs, she may interact with the
Internet and see her information via text or graphics.
A person needs a particular type of computer "account" before
she can access the Internet. This account serves both as her entry pass
and her identification card. The account allows the person to use the
computer or "host" that connects her to the Internet. For example,
typically, a person must type in the password linked to her account
before being allowed to use the computer that will connect to the
Internet. Furthermore, the account is also named and thus identifies
the user of the account and becomes the "handle" of the person using
the account, much like a "handle" used by shortwave or CB radio
enthusiasts. The full name of the account will also identify the host
computer, which may mark the location of the user. For example, the
account "ice@cs.stanford.edu" is the user whose account is named
57
"ice" operating out of the computer system at "cs.stanford.edu."
The World Wide Web has garnered considerable public attention
along with the Internet. The World Wide Web is a subset or
underlying neighbor of the Internet, depending on one's viewpoint.
The Web is a scheme whereby users all have interfaces that allow
them to see graphic images, and sometimes to even hear sound and
see video, and they visit Web "sites" where the computers are ready to
send them graphic information in line with their interface.5 8 The use of
graphics makes the interface much easier to use as a user may point
and click on graphical buttons rather than memorize obscure text
59
commands.
56. See, e.g., NIl REPORT, supranote 55, at 90.
57. The host computer is identified by the hostname and the domain. In this example,
the hostname was "cs", which is the name of a particular host at Stanford University.
Further, "Stanford" marks the domain as Stanford University. Finally, "edu" denotes an
educational institution.
58. NIl REPORT, supranote 55, at 91.
59. See id. (on the graphical nature of the World Wide Web). The most common text
interfaces involve the UNIX operating system, which requires use of obscure shorthand
text commands, such as "cat" to view the contents of a file. Huge books exist and are
necessary to master the commands in UNIX. See generally, e.g., GRAHAM GLASS, UNIX
FOR PROGRAMMERS AND USERS (1993); BRIAN W. KERNIGHAN & ROB PIKE, UNIX
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The Relationships Between Educational Institutions, Students, and the
Internet

Many educational institutions, especially postsecondary schools,
provide free Internet access to their students. 60 Students may register

for Internet accounts and then access the Internet via school
computers tapped into host computers connected to the Internet or
61
from home computers using modems to call into host computers.

These accounts are tagged with the names of the schools and thus
identify communications from students as being from particular
schools. 62 For example, going back to the previous example, when the

student whose account and address is "ice@cs.stanford.edu" sends email to someone, the message is clearly marked as having come from
"ice@cs.stanford.edu." 6a In this particular example, this tag indicates
not only the school, Stanford University, but the department of the

student using the account, as "cs" stands for "computer science."
More and more instructors now require their students to use the
Internet. This ranges from requiring use of Internet resources to
complete assignments to requiring use of Internet-based discussion
groups or electronic mail by holding students accountable for the
information distributed through those means. For example, computer
science and other engineering majors at many postsecondary schools
must use their Internet accounts to access UNIX programming tools
that are on-line to be able to do their homework; there are usually no
PROGRAMMING ENVIRONMENT (1984).
60. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 ("Most colleges and universities
provide access for their students and faculty."). Secondary and earlier-level schools have
not traditionally provided such services, but this is rapidly changing. See, e.g., Susan
Yoachum & Edward Epstein, Clinton Goal - Internet in Every School, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
22, 1995, at Al. Even so, secondary and earlier-level schools are probably unlikely to
provide the individual Internet accounts postsecondary institutions have typically provided
because of cost and lesser resources. Even some universities are having trouble keeping up
with the demand and may have to pass some of the cost on to their students. See Michelle
Quinn, State Colleges Turn to Firms for Internet Access, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 3, 1995, at B1
("After two decades of free access to the Internet, university students will soon have to pay
private industry .. ");Rob Zazueta, UC Online Deal Reflects a Growing Campus Trend:
Heavy demand and not enough lines, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, Nov. 7, 1995, at 1.
61. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 60, at B1.
62. See id. ("Their domain name-the part of the address used when sending mailwill.., read 'berkeley.edu."').
63. Likewise, with other forms of Internet communications such as "write" and "talk,"
the communicator is identified by her account and Internet address. See discussion supra
Part II.C.2; GLASS, supra note 59, at 304-05. However, increasing numbers of clever
computer manipulators have learned to mask such identifications and make their
communications anonymous. Some such deceptions are easy to detect and trace back to
the perpetrator, but some are nearly impossible to expose.
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alternatives to working on and through the Internet. On a similar
note, some instructors make heavy use of newsgroups or mailing lists
to distribute information about the class and will hold students
accountable for any message posted to the newsgroup or e-mailed to
them. Notices about changes to an assignment's parameters or page
limits, for example, or to deadlines, are posted to an Internet-based
newsgroup or distributed via an e-mail mailing list.
In fact, even where use of the Internet is strictly optional, some
students consider the Internet an indispensable tool for procuring
information. E-mail is often a much quicker and easier method of
getting in touch with an instructor or teaching assistant and receiving a
rapid response. Moreover, students have quick and easy access to each
other over the Internet, and where cooperation is allowed, they are
often able to find answers to their questions via e-mailing each other
or checking a newsgroup. They may find that other students had the
same questions and that a newsgroup discussion was already taking
place on the subject. To this end, as well as for administrative
purposes alluded to before, many classes may have newsgroups set up
64
specifically for class use.
Non-technical classes and even law schools are following the lead
of the technical majors in their use of the Internet and Internet
paradigms. In 1995, Professor Eleanor Swift and a few other
professors at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley, began using TWEN, 65 a WESTLAW-based discussion
group much like a newsgroup on the Internet. 66 Professor Swift's
Evidence students were required to post their answers to problems on
the definition of hearsay to the discussion group; this was to be the
only coverage of the definition of hearsay, and students were
responsible for the answers of all of their classmates to all of the
problems on the final examination. 67 In 1997, Professor Pamela
Samuleson's Cyberlaw students could access their syllabus and weekly
reading assignments only through the class Web site. Likewise, class
discussion was continued outside of class via an e-mail mailing list, and
64. E.g., su.class.csl06a (discussion group for Computer Science 106a at Stanford
University). Such discussion groups are typically local and can be accessed only from
university accounts.
65. TWEN stands for The West Educational Network.
66.

The discussion group was functionally very similar to an Internet newsgroup.

However, it was based in WESTLAW networks and was not actually "in" the Internet.
67. Law professors may still feel a little discomfort with leaving such a discussion
exclusively in an Internet paradigm! Here, Professor Swift eventually handed out
photocopies of a printout of the entire discussion, i.e., every student's answer to each
problem as posted to the discussion group, with her comments handwritten in the margins.
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Professor Samuelson used e-mail exclusively to acknowledge receipt
of the first paper assignment and to give her feedback on those papers.
At Stanford University, the use of Internet accounts has actually
become intertwined with all university computer resources. There, all
students need an Internet account to use any university computer. All
computers have a "login" screen requiring entering the name of a
valid Internet account and the accompanying password before
allowing use of the computer. The passwords on the accounts ensure
that university computer resources are used only by authorized
people, and the account itself further does bookkeeping by keeping
track of any charges that accrue by use of computer resources, such as
laser printing.
In sum, educational institutions have several major relationships
with their students in the context of the Internet. First, they are often
the providers of Internet access to their students. Second, the names
of their institutions usually appear with any Internet communications
made by their students. Finally, their students make extensive use of
the Internet for academic purposes.
C.

How Students Use the Internet Apart From Mandated Academic
Purposes

Of course, the vast bulk of all student use of the Internet is
personal use. 68 Students use the Internet extensively as a mail or
phone service, keeping in touch with friends and family across the
country for free or even leaving messages for classmates just across
campus. In fact, some students say their e-mail has become as
indispensable as their phones, and they use it to "flirt, spread the word
about parties, discuss class work with professors and each other,... or
69
sell used futons."
Thus, students socialize on the Internet, sometimes meeting new
people or finding international "pen pals." They discuss topics of
interest on newsgroups. They "surf" the 'Net 7" to find interesting
research and information;7 1 download free computer software,72
68. "Personal," as used here, includes all purposes other than class-based academic
reasons.
69. See Fern Shen, Mouse, Modem, and Identity!: Students Get Personal with Their
Home Pages,WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1995, at Al.

70. The phrase "surf the 'Net" is slang used to mean "using Internet services to
browse information." COMER, supra note 54, at 303.
71. See generally id., at 189; EDDINGS, supra note 50, at 155. The Web has become a
remarkable source of information, and sometimes it is the only place to find current up-tothe-minute data.
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entertaining pictures and sound clips; 73 perform errands or tasks such
as looking for housing; sending flowers; or making airline reservations
without ever leaving their rooms. 74 They check the Web for sports
scores or updates on their favorite television shows. 75 They look for
interesting Web pages or create their own, as an act of self-expression
or to reach out to others.76 For further entertainment, they may play

games on the Internet, ranging from arcade-style action to multi-user
interactive adventures.
While such personal uses may not directly serve the educational
missions of schools, they serve the dual purposes of interesting
students in education 77 and training the students in use of computers
79
and the Internet. 78 Internet skills may feasibly be important for jobs

and general technical competency 80 as the prevalence of the Internet
continues to grow.

72. See EDDINGS, supra note 50, at 59.
73. Id. at 59-60.
74. See, e.g., <http://www.homefindersbulletin.com> (housing listings); <http://
www.iflyswa.com> (Southwest Airlines fares and flight information).
75. See, e.g., <http://www.nba.com> (shows current scores of NBA professional
basketball games).

76. See, e.g., Shen, supra note 69, at Al.
77. Cf. President Clinton, Meeting with Students in San Francisco, Sept. 21, 1995,
quoted in Yoachum & Epstein, supra note 61, at Al ("I want to get the children of
America hooked on education through computers.")
78. Cf. Yoachum and Epstein, supra note 61, at Al (while talking about his goal of all
schools being on the Internet, President Clinton goes on to say he had a plan to achieve
"technological literacy" nationwide).
79. The number of businesses making use of e-mail and the Internet is becoming
increasingly large. See, e.g., NIL REPORT, supra note 55, at 5 ("The Nil can boost the
ability of U.S. firms to compete and succeed in the global economy ....

More than half of

the U.S. work force is in information-based jobs .... New job opportunities can be created
in the processing, organizing, packaging and dissemination of the information and
entertainment products flowing through the NIL."). Already, some people even
"telecommute" into work rather than leave their homes. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1758 (1995) (quoting Administrative
Policy Statement, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,026 (1993)).
80. Many commentators speculating about the "future" of the Internet envision a
number of everyday functions becoming faster and more efficient through the Internet. For
example, seeing the latest movies, playing the hottest video games, banking, and shopping
might all be done from home, via the Internet. See id. See generally NIt REPORT, supra
note 55, at 4-5. As such uses of the Internet become more commonplace, Internet
competency may become a very important skill. If such computerized utopias become
reality, perhaps Internet use will become regarded as on the same level as programming a
VCR.
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What Schools Are Doing in Regulating Internet Expression

Many educational institutions who provide Internet accounts to
their students have general guidelines on the use of those Internet
accounts. These typically govern technical use and inappropriate use
of resources.81 Oftentimes, a student registering for an Internet
account must read and agree to the guidelines online, while setting up
an account; a written copy may also be provided to the student or be
otherwise available.
Increasingly, universities are promulgating content-based
regulations on use of the Internet as well. This may take the form of
explicitly linking use of Internet back to other student conduct
policies. However, following the mindset of federal legislation, 82 more
university policies on use of the Internet are becoming more
restrictive and apply specifically to the Internet. 83 For example, a 1995
draft of proposed guidelines at the University of California, Berkeley,
begins: "The intent of [these guidelines] is to assure that: 1. the use of
the University email is related to University purposes; 2. University
resources are used effectively; 3. disruptions to University activities
about
are avoided; and 4. the University community is 8 informed
4
email.
of
use
acceptable
and
confidentiality, privacy,
The first of these goals is particularly noteworthy considering first
that much student use is personal and second that what constitutes
"University purposes" is fairly ambiguous. The draft policy does go on
to detail:
The University provides access to email systems for the conduct of
University business. Incidental and occasional personal use of email
is permitted within the University so long as such use does not
disrupt or distract the conduct of University business (i.e. due to
volume or frequency). Incidental and occasional use of email is
85
subject to campus regulations.

81. See, e.g., Computer Use Polices, University of California, Berkley (visited Oct. 15,
1998) <http://www.uclink.berkeley.edu/policies.html>.
82. See discussion supra note 41 (discussing Communications Decency Act).
83. See Shear, supra note 18, at Al (Former law school dean Lee Bollinger notes
"universities are reinventing the same kinds of codes [as the speech codes at the University
of Michigan and Stanford that were struck down by the courts] for cyberspace."); see also,
e.g., Princeton University Revokes Ban on Political Speech, supra note 15. For a good
overview of various forms of Internet censorship taking place at a number of universities,
29,
1996)
Dec.
(visited
Internet
the
and
Censorship
Sex,
see
<http://www.eff.org/CAF/cafuiuc.html#iastate>.
84. Electronic Mail Guidelines, University of California, Office of the President,
Information Systems & Administrative Services (Draft 8/21/95).
85. Id.
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This elaboration is helpful but still leaves open to wide
interpretation what "incidental and occasional" mean. At least one
student considered the draft policy to be a "blatant attack on the
unions on campus" that followed "on the heels of a ruling against the
university . . . . that found that the university was reading union
members' email and thus discriminating against the union ....86 This
is borne out by the fact that the draft policy's one clear statement on
non-University purposes explains employee union representatives
87
may not be provided access to university e-mail facilities.
Moreover, the consequences of violations in the draft policy are
severe, resulting in "revocation of the account and/or disciplinary
action up to and including termination, if the violator is an employee,
or dismissal, if a violator is a student . ,88
The University of California's proposed policy is not unusual, nor
is it the most stringent, although in the end, this proposed policy was
rejected. 89 However, as mentioned, Princeton University actually
implemented a policy prohibiting political speech on the Internet,
until this policy too was rejected under intense pressure. As
mentioned, Princeton University essentially prohibited political
speech on the Internet.9" A California school district prohibits
Internet speech which may damage the school's reputation. 91 A
Minnesota school district prohibits "any action that is determined by
their classroom teacher or a system administrator to constitute an
92
inappropriateuse of the Internet."
The enforcement of existing disciplinary measures in educational
institutions regarding censurable Internet expressions echoes this
severity. 93 As mentioned previously, Jake Baker was effectively
expelled from the University of Michigan for posting a perverse sexual
fantasy about the abduction, rape, and torture of a woman named
after a classmate. 94 Four Cornell University freshmen ended up
86. See E-mail Letter from Roger Berkowitz, Student, University of California,
Berkeley, to Kwuan (Oct. 5, 1995) (on file with author).
87. Electronic Mail Guidelines, supra note 84, at § III.A.
88. Id., at § III.E.
89. For the current policy, see Computer Use Policies, University of California,
Berkeley (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <http://www-uclink.berkeley.edu/polices.html>.

90.

See discussion supra notes 15-17 & accompanying text.

91. Eric Epstein, Do College Internet Rules Infringe on Student Rights?, THE RECORD,
Aug. 10, 1997, (Review & Outlook), at 4.
92. Id. (emphasis supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. See generally discussion infra Introduction.
94. See supra discussion and text accompanying notes 35-40; see also Garvey, supra
note 36, at H1.

TYPE No EVIL

1998]

performing fifty hours of community service each and attending
programs on acquaintance rape for originating an e-mail message
listing sexist and vulgar reasons why women should not have freedom
of speech.9 5 A high school student in Ohio was suspended for ten days
for calling his band teacher "an overweight middle-aged man who
doesn't like haircuts" on his Web site.9 6 Only a few schools seem to
tread carefully around the First Amendment.9 7
The typical severity of school actions in these types of
situations-both when schools promulgate Internet-specific policies
restricting student expressions and when they punish students for their
Internet expressions-demands closer examination to ensure that the
rights of students are not being unconstitutionally trammeled.
II
Regulation of Students Qua Students
That the First Amendment applies in public schools is very
clear. 98 Exactly how it applies, however, is not. After the Court's early
declaration upholding the strong rights of public school students to
free expression in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,9 9 the Court has in some senses backed away and now
shows considerable deference to schools. Generally, schools seem to
have broad latitude to regulate students qua students, even when this
encompasses restriction of expression.
A.

"The Schoolhouse Gate"

Three seminal cases outline much of the Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the First Amendment in the context of schools:
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,'
Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser,1° 1 and Hazelwood School

95. See supra discussion and text accompanying notes 18-25.
96. See supra discussion and text accompanying notes 7-10.
97. See Susan Kauffman, Duke Won't Try to Suppress Macabre Web Site, THE NEWS
AND OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1998, at B1 (Duke University did not force student to remove
arguably tongue-in-cheek advice on committing suicide from his Web page after an actual
suicide was linked to the page); Paul Rogers, Student Accused of Defaming Teachers on
Internet, THE RECORD, Feb. 3, 1998, at Al (school district declines to discipline eighthgrade student for posting derogatory and sexual comments about teachers and school
administrators on his Web site).
98. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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Districtv. Kuhlmeier.102 An understanding of the facts and rationale in
those cases is necessary before proceeding.
The Court's opinion in Tinker is the source- of the oft-cited
passage: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
' 10 3
the schoolhouse gate."
In Tinker, some students in Des Moines, Iowa decided to wear
black armbands to their schools from approximately mid-December
until New Year's Day to publicize their desire for peace and
objections to the Vietnam War.1 0 4 The principals of the Des Moines
schools learned of the plan beforehand and adopted a policy
prohibiting wearing armbands to school, violation of which resulted in
suspension until the student was willing to return to school without
any armbands. °5 The students wore the armbands to school anyway
and were suspended.' 0 6
In holding the principals' actions unconstitutional, the Court
found there was no evidence that the armbands created any
disturbance and noted "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.' 1 7 There must be more than "a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint" 10 8 ; rather, there must be a finding that the expression
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." 1 9
Although Tinker Seems to indicate that the school can interfere
with student First Amendment rights only in the case of a "material
and substantial interference," Tinker has been limited in many ways
by opinions continuing to allow limitation of students' First
Amendment rights in school." 0 Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
102. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
103. 393 U.S. at 506. Moreover, "[a] student's rights ... do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions . "d.
I...
at 512-13.
104. Id. at 504.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 508.
108. Id. at 509.
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 511-13.
110. See Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 918 F. Supp. 1475, 1493 n.13 (D.
Wy. 1996) (citing to commentary arguing that Tinker was the "highwater mark for student
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in Tinker contained the caveat, "I cannot share the Court's uncritical
assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights
of children are co-extensive with those of adults."111 Likewise, even
the landmark passage from Tinker is carefully qualified by the clause
'
"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." 112
Thus, many post-Tinker decisions have found
ample room to accord
113
administrators.
school
to
deference
great
In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,114 the Court sustained a
school's penalizing Matthew Fraser by giving him a three-day
suspension and removing his name from the list of candidates for
graduation speaker.' 15 Fraser had delivered a sexually suggestive
speech nominating a fellow student to student government before a
voluntary assembly of approximately 600 students, many of whom
were 14-year-olds. 116 The Court noted the values in tolerating
divergent views and speech "must also take into account consideration
of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the
sensibilities of fellow students." 117 Therefore, the free speech rights of
students must be balanced against "society's countervailing interest 118
in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior"
and "in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive
119
spoken language."
Fraser's speech was vulgar, offensive, insulting to teenage girl
students, and potentially damaging to younger students.1 20 Moreover,
121
it was directed at an "unsuspecting audience of teenage students."

speech rights" and subsequent cases "resulted in abridged speech rights for students.")
111. 393 U.S. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 506.
113. See infra notes 114 - 142 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Vernonia School Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) ("Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere."); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 342 & n. 9 (1985) ("Absent any suggestion that the rule
violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter,
defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are
important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not."); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students do not have same due process rights as adults).
114. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
115. Id. at 678, 687.
116. Id. at 677-78.
117. Id. at 681.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 684.
120. Id. at 683, 685.
121. Id. at 685.
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Accordingly, the school's interest in disciplining such speech won
out.122 The Court also addressed its earlier holdings in Tinker.
Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands
in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any
political viewpoint. "The First Amendment does not prevent school
officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech...
123
would undermine the school's basic educational mission."
Additionally, the Court echoed the language of Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Tinker in pointing out that "the constitutional rights of
students are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
124
other settings."'
In Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,125 the Court sustained a
high school's censorship control over the contents of the school
newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism course
curriculum. 126 The principal reviewed the page proofs of the school
newspaper before publication; for the case at hand, he removed the
pages containing two stories. 127 The first described three students'
experiences with pregnancy, about which the principal was concerned
that the identities of the students were not sufficiently disguised, and
that the article contained references to sexual activity and birth
control inappropriate for some of the younger students.12 The second
discussed the impact of divorce on students and mentioned a
particular student criticizing her divorced father for not spending time
with the family, about which the principal felt the parent should have
129
had opportunity to respond.
Drawing heavily from Tinker and Fraser, but also carefully
distinguishing Tinker, the Court held that schools are entitled to
greater control over student speech they affirmatively promote or
sponsor, such as school publications or theatrical productions.13 ° Thus,
"the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may
punish student expression need not also be the standard for
determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources
122.

Id. at 685-86.

123. Id. at 685; see also id. at 680 ("The marked distinction between the political
'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this
case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals.")
124. Id. at 682.
125. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

126.

Id. at 262, 276.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id. at 270-72.
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to the dissemination of student expression.'1

31

Finally, the Court

underscored the deference to be accorded schools in stating, "the

education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers,32 and state and local school officials, and not of
1
federal judges.'
These three seminal cases on the First Amendment in schools all
involve public secondary or lower schools. Thus, it is possible that the
seeming withdrawal from Tinker in Bethel and Kuhlmeier is tied to the
age of students in secondary and lower schools. The Court has been
somewhat more vigilant in protecting First Amendment rights of
students at the college and university level. For example, in Papish v.
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,133 the Court
disallowed the university's expulsion of a graduate student because of
the content of her newspaper, which she distributed on the university
campus. 134 In particular, one issue reproduced a political cartoon in
which policemen were shown raping the Statue of Liberty and
Goddess of Justice and contained an article entitled, "M --f-Acquitted.' ' 35 The Court reaffirmed that "state colleges and
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment., 136 Moreover, the "mere dissemination of ideas-no
matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus may
not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency." ' 137 As
the cartoon and article title were not constitutionally obscene and
thereby unprotected speech,'138 and as "the First Amendment leaves
no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic
community with respect to the content of speech,"'139 the Court
required the university to reinstate the student.
Therefore, the difference among educational contexts is a factor
in considering whether educational concerns justify restrictions on
speech. The Court looks at the university as a haven for intellectual
discourse and debate in need of the greatest First Amendment
protections. 4 ° On the flip side, the younger, more impressionable, and
131. Id. at 272-73.
132. Id. at 273.
133. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
134. Id. at 667-68, 671.
135. Id. at 667-68.
136. Id. at 669-70 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (internal quotation
marks omitted),
137. Id. at 670.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 671.
140. Cf.Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603
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less developed students in elementary and secondary schools warrant
14 1
more paternalistic constraints on certain types of expression.
B.

The Educational Mission

While the Court has left some tension between its decision in
Tinker and its decisions in Bethel and Hazelwood, especially with
regard to the amount of judicial deference to be accorded school
administrators, there is a recurring theme in these and most all of its
decisions regarding the First Amendment in schools: the role of
education.
For example, in Tinker, the Court describes its views of the
educational process:
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to
accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of
certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an
inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an
142
important part of the educational process.
The Court echoes the importance of intercommunication in
Bethel. "These fundamental values [to be taught in public education]
must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious
143
views, even when these views expressed may be unpopular."
However, Bethel also counterbalances the importance of free
communications against another role of education:
(1967). The Court 'in Keyishian expounded at'length on freedom of speech in schools and
especially in universities:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom .

. .

. That

freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of
ideas. The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection .

. .

. The

essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Mark Cammack & Susan Davies, Should Hate Speech Be Prohibited in Law
Schools?, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 145, 155-56 (1991). But see generally Richard L. Roe, Valuing
Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1271 (1991) (arguing that students in precollege education deserve greater First
Amendment protection than is currently being afforded them).
142. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
143. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic.
It must inculcate the habits and, manners of civility as values in
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the
practice of self-government in the community and the nation....
[Education]
must ...take
into account consideration
of
the ... sensibilities of fellow students ...[and consider the] interest

in teaching students
behavior.

144

the

boundaries

of socially

acceptable

The Court continues that "[t]he process of educating our youth
for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the
curriculum, and the civics class; schools145must teach by example the
shared values of a civilized social order."
Likewise, in Hazelwood, the Court upholds the school's
restriction largely based on the importance of the restriction to the
school's educational mission: it emphasizes that schools must be able
to set high standards for and retain significant control over student
speech which is likely to be attributed to the school, for "[o]therwise,
the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. ,146
The theme we can distill from these cases is that schools have
more latitude to regulate student speech where the speech interferes
with the school's educational mission. This is almost exactly the
language in Bethel: "The First Amendment does not prevent the
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd
speech such as respondent's would undermine the school's basic
educational mission." 147 Likewise, in other First Amendment contexts,
the Court has held that a university does not have to allow First
Amendment
"associational
activities.., where
they infringe
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere
' 1 48
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.'
While these opinions phrase the school's powers to regulate
1 49
negatively, the Court goes a bit further in Widmar v. Vincent,
writing, "[a] university's mission is education, and decisions of this
Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 683.
484 U.S. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685.
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus
and facilities."1 5' This characterizes the school's power positively,
granting the power to regulate so long as the regulation is compatible
with the educational mission and is reasonable, which is broader than
having only the power to prohibit interference.
In other words, a public school may regulate students qua
students in the furtherance of its educational mission. 151 This allows us
to tie together and to some extent resolve tensions among the
decisions in Tinker, Bethel, and Hazelwood. In Tinker, the educational
mission was the general operation of the classroom; the wearing of
armbands did not disrupt this and was therefore allowed. In Bethel,

the educational mission was the promotion of values of civility in
social discourse; vulgarity and lewdness operate contrary to this. In
Hazelwood, the educational mission was likewise the promotion of
cultural values; the school affirmatively promoting or sponsoring
controversial speech worked against its credibility in the community,
which in turn harmed its ability to promote cultural values.
Of course, there is the further tension in Bethel in that there are

actually two goals that were part of the educational mission: first, the
aforementioned promotion of values of civility in social discourse; and

second, the promotion of intercommunication and tolerance of
divergent views. In Bethel, the two educational goals worked against
each other, so the Court balanced the two. 152 Essentially, it found that
150. Id. at 268 n.5.
151. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 267, 318 (1991); J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the
University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399, 418, 426 (1991); Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District
and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 693; Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1770 (1987) (Court determines the "constitutional validity of a
government institution's internal regulation of speech .. . by asking whether the regulation
is necessary in order to achieve the institution's legitimate objectives."); see also Bull v.
Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1460-62 (E.D. Ark. 1990); cf. Cohen
v. San Bernadino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1409-10 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("[A] state
college may [limit classroom speech of its professors] if the limitations involved are
reasonable and narrowly tailored to achieve the college's mission of effectively educating
its students.").
152. That the Court in Bethel simply balanced two educational goals does not
completely resolve the tension between Bethel and Tinker because Tinker rejected civic
education as a goal. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969); Post, supra note 151, at 321. As Bethel is the later decision, and the trend of the
Court is to limit the broad language of Tinker, civic education seems to have been revived
as a valid conception of the public educational mission.
Some lower courts have characterized student-speech cases in three categories rather
than finding one coherent theme under which analysis proceeds:
First, "vulgar" or plainly offensive speech ([Bethel]-type speech) may be
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vulgarity
and lewdness were
not very
important
to
intercommunication - versus, for example, expression of divergent
political views - and that prohibiting vulgarity and lewdness was very
important to the promotion of civility (and the protection of
minors).153 Thus, there is another layer to the ability of public schools
to regulate students 154qua students where there are competing
educational objectives.

This leaves as the central question how to determine whether
regulations are reasonable regulations of students qua students in
furtherance of the educational mission. Following an approach
suggested by Professor Robert Post, three factors bear out the answer:

"(1) the nature of the educational mission of the [school]; (2) the
instrumental connection of the regulation to the attainment of that
mission; and (3) the deference that courts ought to display
toward the
55
instrumental judgment of institutional authorities."1
In regard to the first, Professor Post outlines three different
conceptions of the mission of public educational institutions which the
courts have recognized thus far: (1) civic education; (2) democratic
education; and (3) critical education. 156 The nature of the educational

mission can often be characterized within this framework.
prohibited without a showing of disruption or substantial interference with the
school's work. Second, school-sponsored speech (Hazelwood-type speech) may be
restricted when the limitation is reasonably related to legitimate educational
concerns. Third, speech that is neither vulgar nor school-sponsored (Tinker-type
speech) may only be prohibited if it causes a substantial and material disruption
of the school's operation.
Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 166 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing Chandler
v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992)). Applying such categories rigidly in
student-speech cases seems problematic because: first, it is unclear that the Supreme Court
intended to create such categories rather than having simply found particular results in
particular fact settings, second the categories lose meaning in the university setting, and
third the categories create an incentive to concentrate unduly upon which category a case
falls under, rather than the more flexible and context-specific concerns outlined herein.
153. Bethel., 478 U.S. at 681-84.
154. The court in Poling v. Murphy noted:
Schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order ....
Sometimes, of course, these "shared values" come into conflict with one another;
independence of thought and frankness of expression occupy a high place on our
scale of values, or ought to, but so too do discipline, courtesy, and respect for
authority.
Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (E.D. Ark. 1990)
(quoting Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
155. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 151, at 318.
156. Id. at 319-25. Compare Professor J. Peter Byrne's three moral commitments of the
university, to the values of truth, humanism, and democracy. Byrne, supra note 151.
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Civic education is basically that outlined in Bethel as the
inculcation of civic values, described above. 157 In short, schools must
teach the values, skills, and "self-restraint necessary to the functioning
of a civilized society and understand the need for those external
restraints to which we must all submit if group existence is to be
1 58
tolerable."'
Democratic education is that emphasized in Tinker, where the
purpose is "to prepare students for the 'sort of hazardous
freedom... that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society."' 159 "The chief
characteristic of democratic education is its tendency to assimilate
speech within public educational institutions to a model of public
60
discourse."1

Critical education "views the university as an institution whose
distinctive 'primary function' is 'to discover and disseminate
knowledge by means of research and teaching."' " 61 One of its central
tenets is "the need for unfettered freedom, the right to think the
unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the
unchallengable."' 162 While critical education is more geared toward
postsecondary institutions, under the theory that younger, more
impressionable children are not ready for wide-open robust debate,
Professor Richard Roe argues that there
is a place for critical
163
education with younger children as well.
Once the nature of the educational mission at issue is established
or, as may be the case, competing educational missions are recognized,
the instrumental connection of the regulation to the attainment of that
mission or missions is examined. 164 The more tenuous the connection,
the less latitude a school should have to regulate. For example,
preventing disturbance in the classrooms is a legitimate objective,
under any view of the educational mission; however, what type of
restrictions may be justified under this objective is a more complicated
157. See supra notes 114 -124,143 - 145 and accompanying text.
158. Papish v. University of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 672 (1973) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting), quoted in Post, Racist Speech, supra note 151, at 320.
159. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 151, at 321 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,508-09 (1969)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 322.
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. See generally Roe, supra note 141.
164. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 151, at 318.
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question. A school has the "right to preclude disruption.., through
the creation of a hostile learning environment,, 165 but cannot simply
sweep any regulation under this ambit. The connection between
prohibiting the peaceful wearing of black armbands and a hostile
learning environment is too tenuous and is merely an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. 1 66 On the
other hand, the values of civic education to promote civility are well and directly-served by the prohibition of the "use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse," since such discourse "disfavor[s]
the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to
67
others."1
Finally, the trickiest question remains: how much deference
should courts give to the instrumental judgment of institutional
authorities? 168 This becomes pivotal in establishing the burden on a
public school in showing the instrumental link of its regulation to its
mission and where there are competing educational objectives. The
courts should defer to the schools where the subject of the regulation
"requires insulation from routine judicial oversight for its effective
169
functioning."
For example, in Bethel, the Court deferred to the school's
determination as to what is necessary to promote the civic education
goals at issue: "The schools ... may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that

165. See, e.g., Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1420 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).

166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
167. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); see also, e.g.,
Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 753 (8th Cir. 1987).

168. Post, Between Governance, supra note 151, at 318.
169. Id., at 1783. Similarly:
Local school officials, better attuned than we to the concerns of the
parents/taxpayers who employ them, must obviously be accorded wide latitude in
choosing which pedagogical values to emphasize, and in choosing the means
through which those values are to be promoted. We may disagree with the
choices, but unless they are beyond the constitutional pale we have no warrant to
interfere with them. Local control over the public school, after all, is one of the
nation's most deeply rooted and cherished traditions.
Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1460-61 (E.D. Ark. 1990)

(quoting Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Va.
1992). Some courts are more moderate in their language here, allowing only for a "cautious
deference to the expertise of educational officials within the academic environment."
Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979)

(emphasis supplied).
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tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct .... 170 This
concern outweighed the concern for toleration of speech, given that
the speech at issue "was plainly offensive to both teachers and
students" and "could well be seriously damaging to its less mature
audience."'171
Similarly, where a school promotes or sponsors speech such as the
curricular newspaper in Hazelwood, it is "entitled to greater control
over this..

.

expression to assure that participants learn whatever

lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.' ' 172 The Court reinforced its "oftexpressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily

the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school
officials, and not of federal judges."' 173 Therefore, in this context, the
deference afforded the school is very high, and the regulation of
expression must have "no valid educational purpose ... to require
174
judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights."'

However, in Tinker, "the Court concluded that the mission of
education did not depend upon the exercise of pervasive, managerial
authority."' 175 While the Court noted its historical emphasis on "the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,

170. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.
171. Id. Courts will on 'occasion step in on a school's balancing of competing
educational objectives. For instance, in Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George
Mason Univ., the court found that the censored behavior did undermine:
the education of minority and women students, the university's mission to
promote learning through a culturally diverse student body, the university's
mission to eliminate racist and sexist behavior on campus and the university's
mission to accomplish maximal desegregation of its student body. Although the
university has these interests, there has been no substantial or material disruption
of [the] educational mission. [Citations omitted.] The student activity at issue...
is consistent with [the] educational mission in conveying ideas and promoting the
free flow and expression of those ideas.
Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 794
(E.D. Va. 1991). This could also be seen as the court finding the university's restriction of
the activity in question to be too tenuously connected to the educational goals proffered
rather than a second-guessing of the university's prioritization of these goals.
172. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
173. Id. at 273.
174. Id.
175. Post, Between Governance, supra note 151, at 1779 (likening Tinker to Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
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to prescribe and control conduct in the schools," 17 6 such regulation
does not require complete insulation from judicial intervention. Thus,
the public school authority must meet the heavy burden of showing its
regulation was promulgated out of "more than a mere desire to avoid.
. . discomfort and unpleasantness"'177 and further showing the
"conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
requirements
178
school.'
C.

Academic Freedom

The question of whether a regulation is valid because it is a
reasonable regulation of students qua students in furtherance of the
educational mission can also be approached from the other side, that
is, whether the student expression being regulated is protected by the
rights of academic freedom. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the

University of the State of New York, 7 9 the Court wrote:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
the First Amendment, which does
180
classroom.
the
over
orthodoxy
Similarly, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire181 the Court notes:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation . . . . Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
182
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
These and other allusions to "academic freedom" have largely
been in this type of sweeping language and rhetoric. 183 As a result, the
176. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
177. Id. at 509.
178. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
180. Id. at 603.
181. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
182. Id. at 250.
183. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 257 (1989).
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doctrine surrounding academic freedom rights is somewhat
incomprehensible. "There has been no adequate analysis of what
academic freedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it."1" 4
In turn, it is quite unclear when rights of academic freedom are
triggered and under what circumstances they are violated. Professor J.
Peter Byrne outlines the confusion as follows:
Isolating [the] legal right has proven difficult, in part because courts
have employed several legal doctrines that are not themselves based
on academic freedom to protect the liberties of professors and
students. At the same time, courts have declined to recognize a
constitutional shield for many forms of classroom speech that seem
at first blush to implicate general principles of free expression. This
confusion has led some commentators to put a large array of legal
principles under the umbrella of academic freedom, but it has led
others to doubt that the law recognizes an independent right of
academic freedom at all. l" 5
Nonetheless, a few situations seem generally accepted as
involving academic freedom. The prototype is the teacher's or
professor's right to teach or research what she pleases without undue
interference from trustees, regents, or other laypersons.1 8 6 For
example, the Court in Keyishian was concerned with regulations that
would chill a professor's speech on controversial or politically
sensitive topics."17 The extent to which students enjoy academic
freedom rights, however, is dubious. In fact, Professor Byrne argues
that students do not and should not have any rights of academic
freedom:
[N]o recognized student rights of free speech are properly part of
constitutional academic freedom, because none of them has
anything to do with scholarship or systematic learning. Cases
allowing public school students to wear armbands, demonstrate in
good order, distribute newspapers, and form political organizations
grant students rights against public education officials plainly
analogous to those enjoyed generally by citizens against
government. Moreover, such activities have little to do with the
formal academic training of the students; even if the activities so
protected have learning value, the learning seems more the product
of experience than of intellectual training .

. .

. Courts have also

refused to review academic evaluations of students by universities.
In short, while student civil rights enforce social norms against
schools, constitutional academic freedom enforces academic norms
against society. Thus, while the Constitution affords students at

184. Id. at 252.
185. Id. at 256; see also id. at 295-98.
186. Id. at 273, 278-79.
187. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 601-02.
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public institutions extensive civil rights, it affords them no rights of
academic freedom at all.188
Rather, Professor Byrne argues "academic freedom should be
understood to include189only rights unique or necessary to the functions
of higher education."
Regardless of whether Professor Byrne is right about whether
students should fall under academic freedom, the case law is
ambiguous and confused, leaving some room for student rights of
academic freedom. Sweezy indicates "[t]eachers and students must
always remain free to inquire ....

190 Even under Professor Byrne's

definition, students' ability to inquire freely could be considered
"unique or necessary to the functions of higher education"191 since the
classroom "marketplace of ideas" involves an interchange both
between teacher and student and among students, in any case,
requiring student participation.
But even if students do enjoy the constitutional right to academic
freedom, it is unclear what that means in a practical sense. Teachers
have tried to use it in situations as varied as retaliatory dismissal or
denial of tenure, charges of discrimination, and disclosure of
confidential university files during discovery. 192 Seemingly, though,
"academic freedom does not insulate speakers from being penalized
for the content of their speech. Academic freedom only requires that
speakers be evaluated by their peers for relative professional
competence and within the procedural restrains of the tenure
system."193

Given that the viability of student rights to academic freedom is
in question, and that the scope of and standards governing any such
rights are unclear, it makes sense not to approach the question of
student speech from the student academic freedom angle. Rather,
these concerns can be handled in analysis of whether a regulation is a
valid regulation of students qua students. As that analysis requires
scrutiny of the instrumental connection between a regulation and the
educational mission, it should in theory subsume the issues raised
under academic freedom.

188. Byrne, supra note 183, at 262.
189. Id. at 264.
190. 354 U.S. at 250 (emphasis supplied).
191. Byrne, supra note 183, at 264.
192. See Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom: Protection for
Institution or Individual?, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 492, 493-94 (1988).
193. Byrne, supra note 183, at 283.
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For example, if a teacher prohibited a student from raising her
hand during a history discussion to talk about why she thought the
Holocaust never took place, the academic-freedom issues would
probably include the student asserting an academic-freedom right to
have her comments judged by her peers, or other teachers, for their
academic value. Also, the teacher's academic freedom and right to
control her classroom would conflict with the student's rights.
Under the opposite-angle analysis, the educational mission might
be civic education, under which the teacher asserts that the racial slurs
implicit or explicit in the student's comments denigrate the values of
civil discourse. Determining this might be facilitated by looking into
or conjecturing about the views of the student's peers, or other
teachers, on whether the comments were within the bounds of civility
necessary for the educational mission at that school. Moreover, the
goals of democratic and critical education would work counter to civic
education, mirroring the tension between the student's and teacher's
rights in the academic-freedom analysis. In other words, the schoolperspective analysis will largely address the concerns of academicfreedom analysis. Therefore, for clarity, this Comment concentrates
on the school-perspective analysis.
D. The Special Case of University Speech Codes
One of the most powerful illustrations of restrictions on free
speech in educational contexts has been the promulgation of "campus
speech codes." I treat them separately because they have often raised
issues of vagueness and/or overbreadth in violation of due process,
issues preempting the constitutional analysis raised in sections A-C of
this Part.
Campus speech codes were enacted by a number of institutions of
higher learning in the 1980s to fight the tide of rising racism and
intolerance. 194 While all make specific reference to factors such as
race, gender, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation, campus speech
codes typically take one of two basic forms: (1) a policy prohibiting
direct face-to-face acts of verbal or physical abuse against others; or
(2) a broader policy prohibiting racially or sexually offensive behavior
195
without regard to whether it is directed to particular individuals.
194. Cf. generally Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech
Protection Act of 1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L.

REV. 1469 (1990).
195. See Cammack & Davies, supra note 141, at 146. I address in particular only these
types of speech codes and regulations here; there are, of course, others, especially in
secondary and lower schools. See generally, e.g., Stephenson v. Davenport Community Sch.

1998]

TYPE No EVIL

The broader policies seem to be more common1 96 and also more
problematic.
The broader campus speech codes have run afoul of the First
Amendment in two ways. First, they suffer problems of overbreadth.
A restriction is overbroad when it prohibits too much, that is, even
though it prohibits activities which it may constitutionally prohibit, it
also prohibits activities protected by the First Amendment. 197 If there

is no satisfactory way to sever the unconstitutional prohibitions from
198
the scope of the restriction, the entire restriction is unconstitutional.
Second, campus speech codes do not, as defending universities
have contended, meet the criteria-for the "fighting words" exception
to protected expression. "Fighting words" are those that "by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." 199 However, determination of "fighting words" has come to
emphasize the actual words less than the context in which the words
are spoken. 200 Thus, speech codes which emphasize the actual words
are unlikely to be upheld under "fighting words" doctrine.
Consequently, those broader campus speech codes which have
been challenged seem to have all been found unconstitutional. The

first domino was the broad speech code at the University of Michigan
struck in 1989 by the District Court in Doe v. University of
Michigan.2 1 The University of Michigan established a three-tier
policy in which greater restrictions were imposed depending on the
location where the speech or conduct occurred. 2 2 There were the least
Dist., 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997) (striking down school district regulation prohibiting
gang symbols).
196. See Cammack & Davies, supra note 141, at 146-47
197. See Board of Airport Comm., of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)
(rule prohibiting all "First Amendment activities" in airport terminal unconstitutionally
overbroad); Thornhill v. Alabama, 410 U.S. 88 (1940) (statute prohibiting all picketing
unconstitutionally overbroad); see generally LAURENCE H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-27 to 28, at 1022-29 (2d ed. 1987).

TRIBE,

AMERICAN

198. See, e.g., Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 965-66 (1984) ("no
core of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct that the statute
prohibits"). This is not to say that the amount and significance of the inclusion of protected
expression has no bearing. In particular, where a restriction governs "conduct" rather than
"pure speech," there must be substantialoverbreadth before the restriction will be voided.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); see also TRIBE, supra note 197, § 12-28,
at 1025.
199. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
200. Cf.Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (noting that "no individual actually
or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a
direct personal insult"); see also TRIBE, supra note 197, § 12-10, at 852.
201. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
202. Id. at 856.
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restrictions in designated "public" parts of campus and the most in
"educational and academic centers, such as classroom buildings,
libraries, research laboratories, recreation and study centers."2 °3 The
greatest restrictions subjected persons to discipline for verbal and
physical behavior that "stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the
basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed,
national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam
veteran status," among other things.20 4 The court held the policy to be
20 5
unconstitutional for its problems of overbreadth and vagueness.
The court noted that it was "sympathetic to the University's obligation
to ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its students, [but]
2 6
such efforts must not be at the expense of free speech.,
Two years later, a similar policy at the University of Wisconsin
was struck down by the District Court in UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of
Regents of University of Wisconsin.2°7 That rule disciplined students
for:
racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive
behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at
different individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments,
epithets or other expressive behavior or physical conduct
intentionally:
1.
Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the
individual or individuals; and
2.
Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning
environment for education, university-related work, or other
20 8
university-authorized activity.
The court again found that the policy in question was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and failed to qualify for the
20 9
"fighting words" exception.
203.

Id. Publications sponsored by the University were not covered by the policy. Id.

204. Id. (quoting

the University

of Michigan Policy

on Discrimination

and

Discriminatory Harassment).

205. Id. at 866, 867.
206. Id. at 868. First Amendment protections come into tension with Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection concerns in the realm of speech codes; under current
doctrines, the First Amendment concerns seem to hold the upper hand, as can be seen by

this statement by the Doe court. Some espouse departing from conventional views to allow
more latitude for speech codes. For example, one commentator suggests reframing the
issues into an affirmative action mold. See Alice K. Ma, Comment, Campus Hate Speech
Codes: Affirmative Action in the Allocation of Speech Rights, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1995).
207. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).

208. Id. at 1165 (citations omitted).
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The discriminatory harassment policy at Central Michigan
University fell next in Dambrot v. Central Michigan University,210 and
the speech code at Stanford University followed suit in 1995 in Corry
v. Leland Stanford Junior University.211 Both policies were
reminiscent of those in the University of Michigan and the University
of Wisconsin. For example, the Central Michigan University policy
prohibited racial and ethnic harassment, defined as:
Any intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal, or non-verbal
behavior that subjects an individual to an intimidating, hostile or
offensive educational, employment or living environment by... (c)
demeaning or slurring individuals through.., written literature
because of their racial or ethnic affiliation; or (d) using symbols,
[epithets] or slogans that infer negative
connotations about the
212
individual's racial or ethnic affiliation.
The District Courts in Dambrot and Corry both faulted the policy
in question for overbreadth and vagueness and did not find "fighting
213
words" to apply.
Both decisions also considered the effect of the more recent
United States Supreme Court decision in R.A.V. v. St. Paul.214 R.A.V.
further narrowed the use of the "fighting words" doctrine to defend
such speech codes by holding that under most circumstances 21a5
regulation of fighting words may not favor a particular viewpoint.
Stanford attempted to circumvent this limitation by claiming its policy
fell under any of five exceptions to the R.A.V. holding regarding
216
"fighting words," but the court rejected each argument in turn.
Dambrot was the only one of these cases to go up to the court of
appeals, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the Central Michigan

209. Id. at 1168-81. In considering "fighting words," the court also discussed. a
balancing test, parallels to Title VII, and a proposed limiting construction, and found that
none saved the restriction. Id. at 1173-78.
210. 849 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
211. No. 740309 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995). Stanford University is a
private institution but is brought within the purview of the First Amendment by California
Education Code section 94367, the so-called "Leonard Law." See id. Part II.

212.

Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 839 F. Supp. 477, 481

213. Id. at 481-84; Corry, No. 740309, § I.
214. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
215. See id. at 283-85.
216. Corry, No. 740309, at Part I.B. The five exceptions were: (1) where the entire class
of speech is proscribable; (2) where the proscribed subset of "fighting words" is more likely
to provoke retaliatory violence than typical "fighting words"; (3) where the proscribed
subset of "fighting words" is directed at certain persons or groups; (4) where the regulation
is concerned with secondary effects associated with the proscribed subset rather than the
offensiveness of the content; and (5) where no official suppression of ideas is afoot. Id.
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University policy was facially invalid for vagueness and overbreadth
without extensive discussion. 217 The court wrote:
[T]here is nothing to ensure the University will not violate First Amendment

rights even if that is not their intention. It is clear from the text of the policy that
language or writing, intentional or unintentional, regardless of political value, can
be prohibited upon the initiative of the university. The broad scope of the policy's
language presents a "realistic danger" that thy
2 18University could compromise the
protection afforded by the First Amendment.

It also borrowed liberally from the district court's opinion in Doe
v. University of Michigan:
What the University could not do, however, was establish an antidiscrimination policy which had the effect of prohibiting certain

speech because it disagreed with ideas or messages sought to be
conveyed ....Nor could the University proscribe speech simply
because it was found to be offensive, even gravely so, by large
219
numbers of people.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the "fighting words" claim
under the principles of R.A. V. in about two paragraphs, noting simply,
"Under R.A.V., the CMU policy constitutes content discrimination
because it necessarily requires the university to assess the racial or
ethnic content of the speech., 220 In sum, the only circuit court to
consider the issue agreed heartily with the district court decisions on
the subject.
Since the 1989 decision in Doe v. University of Michigan,221 there
has been a marked decrease in the promulgation of similar speech
codes. 222 The continued rejection of such speech codes by the courts
will assumably lead to further such self-restraint on the part of
educational institutions. However, as none of the challenges to
campus speech codes has reached the United States Supreme Court,
the constitutionality of speech codes may not be settled. Numerous
scholars and commentators have suggested approaches and
philosophies under which typical university speech codes are (or
should be) constitutional.22 3 As they have not defended speech codes
217.
218.
219.

See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182-86 (6th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1183.
Id. (quoting Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989)).

220.

Id. at 1184.

221.

721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).

222. For a discussion of speech codes generally and reviewing the policies at some of
the largest public universities, see Richard K. Page & Kay H. Hunnicut, Freedom for the
Thought We Hate: A Policy Analysis of Student Speech Regulation at America's Twenty
Largest Public Institutions,21 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1994).

223.

See, e.g., Ma, supra note 206; Post, supra note 151; Charles Lawrence, If He

Hollers Let Him Go, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990).
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in the same manner as was attempted unsuccessfully in Doe, Dambrot,
UWM Post, and Corry, it is possible that appeals on these theories
could succeed if a higher court were to adopt their viewpoints. In the
meantime, however, the trend continues to go against the
constitutionality of university speech codes.
III
Regulation of Students Sine Qua Non
Where a public school's regulation of expression does not
constitute a valid regulation of students qua students, the school
context becomes less important to the constitutional analysis, and
more "standard" First Amendment doctrines come into play.
However, these too raise complexities. Student expression taking
place on the Internet raises all the fears of the Internet as a new,
advanced, and powerful medium of communication.2 24 Furthermore, it
convolutes First Amendment "public forum" analysis by straining the
conception of "where" the communication is taking place.
Unfortunately, these concerns have triggered some alarm and have
prompted premature departure from existing First Amendment
jurisprudence
and/or
inconsistent
application
based
on
225
Internet.
the
of
nature
the
of
misunderstandings
A. The Internet as a Medium of Speech
1. The FirstAmendment's Application in Different Media
The Court has consistently held that different media of
communication raise different First Amendment concerns. 226 The
224. See supra notes 2, 4, 41, 256-260.
225. Cf Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace, Keynote Address at the
First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy (March 26, 1991) (transcript available
at
<http://cpsr.org/cpsr/free-speech/tribe-constitutioncyberspace.txt>)
("The

Constitution's core values, I'm convinced, need not be transmogrified, or metamorphosed
into oblivion, in the dim recesses of cyberspace ....

[But] the danger is clear and present

that they will be."). This danger arises because "Judges may not understand the novel
situations, especially those involving the Internet." Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1792.

226. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each
medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems."); Red Lion Broad. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969) ("[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied. to them."). For a discussion of why
the Court should not treat different media differently, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.
A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging Communications

Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995). Krattenmaker and Powe argue that televisions,
computers, telephones, and radios are "no longer distinct devices and ... any differences
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medium of the press has always been one of the most revered and
most protected. Newspapers present a broad range of opinions to
227
readers and engender a flourishing marketplace of ideas.
Accordingly, the Court has been reluctant to entertain restrictions on

228
the press. For example, in Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo,

the Court struck down a statute, that requires newspapers that assail a
political candidate on his character or record to print that candidate's
reply, as an unconstitutional control of speech.22 9 In so holding, the
Court reaffirmed the broad deference to be afforded editorial
judgments on what to publish, 230 and observed:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
231
consistent with [the] First Amendment ....
In marked contrast, the Court has upheld the "fairness doctrine"
promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, which
requires that radio and television broadcasters carry discussion of
public issues and give each side of those issues fair coverage. 23 2 In Red

Lion Broadcasting Co., v. Federal Communications Commission,233

the Court reviewed the fairness doctrine as it was applied to a radio
station. The Court found that the characteristics of broadcast radio
made it quite unlike the press. 234 In particular, the scarcity of radio
frequencies limits the number Of people who may broadcast.23 5 Thus,
"[t]here is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private
236
censorship operating in a medium not open to all.,
Cable television does not suffer from the scarcity problems of
broadcast radio. Therefore, the Court in Turner BroadcastingSystem,
among them are ephemeral." Id. at 1719.
227. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,248 (1974).
228. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
229. Id. at 244, 258.
230. Id. at 255-56.
231. Id. at 258.
232. See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,369 (1969).
233. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
234. See id. at 388 ("[I]t is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.").
235. Id. at 390, 396-98.
236. Id. at 392.
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Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,237 held that "the
rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment
scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases
' 238
elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation."
Moreover, "[c]able television partakes of some of the aspects of
speech and communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of
newspaper
and
book
publishers,
public
speakers,
and
'
239
pamphleteers."
Nevertheless, the Court does not seem to consider
cable television as protected as the press. In Turner, cable television
operators challenged Congressional must-carry laws requiring them to
240
carry local broadcast television stations on their cable networks.
The Court found the must-carry laws did "not pose such inherent
dangers to free expression, or present such potential for censorship or
manipulation, as to justify application of the most exacting level of
First Amendment scrutiny," 241 and it applied only intermediate
scrutiny before finding it necessary to remand.2 42
Apart from "fairness" and must-carry provisions, the Court's
jurisprudence has also examined the ability of the government to
censor indecent 243 material in different media. For example, in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,244 the Court
held the Federal Communications Commission has the power to
regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent, though not obscene. 245 The
Court found that special treatment of indecent broadcasting was
justified by the "unique" attributes of broadcasting. 246 Notably,
broadcasting is "uniquely pervasive" in the manner it intrudes upon
the home without prior warning of content and is "uniquely accessible
to children, even those too young to read. 24 7
However, the Court considered a similar issue in the medium of
the telephone in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission.248 In Sable Communications, an adult
237.

512 U.S. 622 (1994).

238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 637.
Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
See Turner,512 U.S. at 622.
Id. at 661.

242. Id.

243.
receive
244.
245.
246.

"Indecent" is a step down from "obscene." While obscene materials do not
constitutional protections, indecent materials do.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 748-49.

247. Id.
248. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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telephone "dial-a-porn" message service challenged a rule prohibiting
indecent telephone messages.249 The Court differentiated between the
telephone medium and the broadcast medium because the telephone
"dial-it" medium "requires the listener to take affirmative steps to
receive the communication. There is no 'captive audience' problem
....
"250 Thus, "[u]nlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast,
the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service
is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener
'
from avoiding exposure to it."251
2.

How the Internet Compares to Other Media

It is not yet clear where the Internet as a medium of
communication fits into these paradigms of First Amendment
protection. However, there are many indications that people view the
Internet as so different a medium of communication that it should be
less protected than any previously existing media. If these views are
given life by the courts, history will be repeating itself.
In 1915, the Supreme Court upheld a broad, content-based
regulation of films, at least in part because moving pictures are "mere
representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and
known, vivid, useful and entertaining no doubt, but, as we have said,
capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of their
252
attractiveness and manner of exhibition."
Of course, thirty-seven years later, the Supreme Court reversed
this position by striking down a similarly broad, content-based
regulation of films. 253 Now, films are commonplace, and the fear of
their "power" to unduly influence or generate "evil" is relatively
low.

25 4

Now, however, a new monster "capable of evil, having power for
it" has reared its head, and it is the Internet. 5 Much of the popular
249. Id. at 117-18.
250. Id. at 127-28.
251. Id.
252. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915),
overruled in partby Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1951).
253. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1951).
254. Few films are banned outright from display. See Abundance of Ice to Toast the
Bag, The HERALD (Glasgow), Mar. 27, 1996. Rather, restrictions come in the form of a
rating system that prohibits view of certain films to people of certain ages. See "Last
Temptation" Ban to Stay in Froze, THE SCOTSMAN, Jan. 6, 1994. But see Court Says
Government Erred in Banning Film, Associated Press (South Africa), Oct. 27, 1992.
255. See Carlos Santos, 1990s Worries About Internet Parallel 1910, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, June 20, 1996, at B1 (comparing fears regarding Internet to early 1900s fears
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portrayal of the Internet is misleading. For example, novels and
movies often depict the Internet as a medium by which illicit
individuals can take advantage of the world's reliance on computers to
the Internet
seize totalitarian power.25 6 Even news media dramatizes
257
as a source of dangerous information and materials.
Time magazine featured a cover story on the dangers and
profusion of pornography readily available on the Internet. 8 The
bulk of the article was based on a study by an undergraduate at
Carnegie Mellon University named Marty Rimm.25 9 Apparently, there
were some concerns about the study before the article was published,
but Time went forward with the story. 260 As a consequence, a wave of
panic reverberated throughout the public as parents and wellintentioned citizens decried these dangers.
However, as the concerns about the study came to full light, the
story sparked intense criticism. Numerous attacks on the article
pointed to glaring problems with the study's research methodology
and use of misleading statistics as well as general credibility problems
261 Time eventually admitted to "damaging flaws" in
of Marty Rimm.
2
its article.

26

The courts should thus be wary of following the lead of the
general public and the media; instead, they should take guidance from
the Court's conclusions after considering the medium of cable
television in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal

regarding motion pictures; "[a]s if the moving figures could reach down into the audience
and corrupt the morals of young people.").
256. See, e.g., LAWNMOWER MAN, supra note 2; LAWNMOWER MAN II, supra note 2;
THE NET, supra note 2. One commentator called The Net "technically accurate in some
ways [but an] example[] of the disturbing emphasis on the seamier side or more foreboding
aspects of the Internet presented in the mass media today." Geiger, supra note 4, at B5.
257. See Vince Horuchi, Bomb Building Made Easy on the Internet, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Aug. 11, 1996, at Al. However, Professor Frank Tuerkheimer notes that, "[t]he Internet is
not a source of information. It's a means of conveying information. Bomb-making
information is incredibly available through other means." Id. In fact, instructions for
making bombs have been readily available in libraries and bookstores for many years. Id.
258. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn - It's Popular,
Pervasive and Surprisingly Perverse, According to the First Survey of Online Erotica. And
There's No Way to Stamp it Out, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38.
259. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Firestorm on the Computer Nets: A New Study of
Cyberporn, Reported in a Time Cover Story, Sparks Controversy, TIME, July 24, 1995, at 57.
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., id.; Peter H. Lewis, Porn Study Torn Apart on the Internet: Student's
Thesis Hits the Media Big Time, Then Crashes in Cyberspace, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB.,
July 25, 1995, at 12.
262. Geiger, supra note 4, at B5.
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Communications Commission.263 In that case, the Court refused to use
264

a relaxed standard in scrutinizing a restriction on cable television.
The Court noted:
This is not to say that the unique physical characteristics of cable
transmission should be ignored when determining the
constitutionality of regulations affecting cable speech. They should
not .... But whatever relevance these physical characteristics may
have in the evaluation of particular cable regulations, they do not
require the alteration of settled principles of our First Amendment
265
jurisprudence.
Likewise, the Internet is physically and technologically different
than previous media of communication, but this should not necessarily
relax the scrutiny afforded restrictions placed on expression "within"
it.
Fortunately, thus far, the Supreme Court has agreed, refusing to
adopt different or relaxed standards for Internet censorship in striking
down portions of the Communications Decency Act which prohibited
transmission of "obscene or indecent" materials to minors over the

Internet in Reno v.

ACLU;266

the Court found the provisions in

question were vague and overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment and that the Government did not have a significant
interest justifying the censorship. 26 7 However, the reliance on
vagueness and overbreadth makes the impact of Reno v. ACLU
unclear for future Internet cases. Certainly, schools have not stopped
adopting broad restrictions or punishments for Internet speech.2 68
Moreover, the Internet will continue to challenge the traditional
paradigms and analogies used to analyze First Amendment
protections.2 69 Several factors may justify treating the Internet
differently than other media for the purposes of the First Amendment:
"Internet dissemination is fast (instantaneous, one would say) ... it is
global (almost) and the actual and potential audience is huge. It is also
263.

114 S.CT.. 2445 (1994).

264. Id. at 2456-57.
265. Id. at 2457 (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 , 117 S. Ct. 2329; see also Robert S.
Peck & Ann K. Symons, Kids Have First Amendment Rights, Too, 8 AM. LIBR. 28 (1997)
("[I]nterpreting Reno v. ACLU as holding that First Amendment principles apply with
undiminished validity in the vast, uninhibited expanses of cyberspace."); David J. Loundy,
Internet Speech Cases Cinch Broad Freedom, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULL., July 10, 1997,

at 5 (Reno v. ACLU "affords the Internet broad First Amendment protection.").
267. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
268. See discussion and text accompanying supra notes 1-43.
269. See Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1792.
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less public: the same [potentially controversial or objectionable]
images can be sent to your terminal in the privacy of your own
room." 270 "With a few brief touches of a finger, a speaker is now able

271
to communicate to thousands or even millions of people ....
However, the speed and reach of the Internet is not completely
unlike those of broadcasting or cable television. Both broadcasting
and cable television are virtually instantaneous and have the capacity
to reach vast audiences. The most salient difference is that the
Internet allows the average user essentially to be a broadcaster rather
than just a listener or viewer. But this cuts in the positive direction as
well as the negative. While the accessibility of the Internet increases
the ability to spread offensive or objectionable expression, it likewise
increases the ability to spread "desirable" expression.
Accordingly, several commentators have argued persuasively that
the existing standards used to analyze First Amendment issues
"generally seem an adequate start and must simply be adapted to new
settings." 272 Pointedly, while the Internet may offer some new risks, it
273
has enormous potential for benefit as well.
"The Internet will be a superior First Amendment forum due to
its immediacy and interactive nature .... Free and unfettered speech

will be similar to that which Americans have long enjoyed. The only
difference is digital speech will be more plentiful, more robust, and
less regulated.

274

270. Paul F. Burton, Freedom of Speech & Censorship on the Internet, Paper Delivered
at Queen Margaret College, Edinburgh, Nov. 23, 1994 (visited Dec. 29, 1996)
<http://www.dis. strath.ac.uk/ftp/paul/Censorship.html>.
271. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1792.
272. Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace, Keynote Address
at
the
First
Conference
on
Computers,
Freedom
&
Privacy
<http://cpsr.org/cpsr/free-speech/tribe-constitution-cyberspace.txt>;
Cass R. Sunstein,
supra note 79, at 1765; Jason Schwartz, UT Police May Have to Confront, Police Internet
Abuse, DAILY TEXAN, Dec. 4, 1995, at 5 (quoting Professor Michael Froomkin: "By and
large, most of the incidents involving the Internet can be solved if you look at them without
considering the Internet.").
273. See Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1804. See also, e.g., Nil REPORT, supra note 55.
274. Robert J. Posch, A World Impregnated by American Ideals, DIRECT MARKETING,
July 1, 1996, at 62. Paul Burton balances this against the need for censorship and concludes
benefits and freedom win:
The Internet has the potential to free up information exchange in an
unprecedented way . . . and while we are still a long way from an

information rich global society, that to me is a more important goal
than the censorship of a relatively small proportion of the whole. For
most of us using the Internet, there is always the choice not to read that
material, just as we have the choice to switch off our television sets or
not to buy printed publications.
Burton, supranote 270.
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This is reminiscent of newspapers presenting a broad range of
opinions and engendering a flourishing marketplace of ideas; in this
sense, the Internet seems worthy of greater protection, like the
press. 275 Realistically, however, the courts do not seem likely to
276
extend to any other medium the same protection as the press.

Of course, the negative aspects of the speed and reach of the
Internet are not strictly flights of fancy. "A libelous message, or
grotesque invasions of privacy, can be sent [on the Internet] almost
costlessly. Perhaps reputations and lives will be easily ruined or at

least damaged., 277 Marty Rimm may have been a fraud, but the issue
he raised-whether children can access pornography with ease-is
certainly a legitimate cause for concern. However, recognizing these
hazards does not equate to finding a need to rewrite existing First
278
Amendment standards.

In fact, technology is slowly but surely addressing these concerns.
The latest version of Microsoft Outlook Express, a program used to

read and organize electronic mail, has the capability of screening out
junk mail or other undesired mail. A number of software programs
allow parents to prohibit access to Internet Web sites with
pornography or other objectionable material, and a number of the
people who run such sites now require registration with an
independent age-verification service before allowing access. Not every
problem has been solved, of course, but it is premature to repeat the
1915 mistake of condemning motion pictures as "evil."

275. See discussion supra notes 227-231 and accompanying text. However, the
marketplace of ideas is only one theoretical framework explaining the purposes of First
Amendment freedom of expression. See Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1759-65 (discussing the
marketplace-of-ideas, Madisonian, and Turner views of the First Amendment). In fact,
Sunstein argues the Madisonian view is the best as a matter of constitutional law. Id. at
1762. While a full discussion of the ramifications of the Internet for different theoretical
frameworks is impossible here, it is worth noting that the nature of Internet
communications may reduce public deliberation and allow people to easily screen out
objectionable ideas, both abhorrent to the Madisonian view and addressed by Sunstein. See
id. at 1785-87.
276. See Generally Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S.367(1969). Distinction between
print media and broadcast media, since may have made sense when most communities had
many daily newspapers and few radio/TV stations. Those distincitions currently are
criticized because most communities have only one or two daily newspapers and many
radio/TV stations, so variety of views likely to find way onto the airwaves without
governmental intrusion.
277. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1792.
278. Cf.id. ("At this stage, it remains unclear whether the conventional legal standards
should be altered to meet such problems.").
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Therefore, courts should follow the lead of Reno v. ACLU and
use existing First Amendment standards to examine Internet issues
unless they prove untenable at a future date.
B.

Forum Analysis

So while the Internet as a medium of communication does not
merit an entirely novel approach to First Amendment protection, it
still strains existing First Amendment jurisprudence. In particular, the
noncorporeal nature of the Internet creates difficulties for "public
forum" analysis.
1. The Convoluted Web of "PublicForum" Analysis
In considering restrictions on expression, the Court has
traditionally been most concerned with whether the government is
targeting a particular message or viewpoint, that is, emplacing
content-based restrictions. When a restriction is content-neutral,
however, the Court has often considered where the expression takes
place. The amount of scrutiny the Court gives to a content-neutral
restriction often depends on the location. The rationale is that certain
locations play more important roles in communication and expression.
For example, "public fora" such as streets and parks have "long been
devoted to assembly and debate" 279 and should be particularly open to
free expression, especially since many people may lack access to more
280
elaborate and expensive channels of communication.
By this "forum" analysis, locations can be grouped in three
categories of public fora, according to their importance to speech: (1)
traditional or specially designated public fora, such as streets and
parks, which have traditionally been havens for expression; (2) limited
public fora, which are open for the use of certain expressive activities;
and (3) non-public fora, which are not designated for any type of
public communications. 281 When the government places a restriction
on expressions within public fora, it receives the most (and strictest)
scrutiny, and when it places a restriction on expressions within its own
private properties, that is, non-public fora, it receives the least; thus,
most restrictions in public fora fail constitutional scrutiny, and most in
282
non-public fora pass.
279.
280.
281.

Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.

282. This implies that restrictions in limited public fora are the middle ground and
would thus fail some of the time and pass some of the time. However, this may not be the
case. Since Perry Educ. Ass'n, the Court has elaborated that the distinction between
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As an example, consider the public university. In Widmar v.
Vincent,283 the Court observed that public universities "possess many
of the characteristics of a public forum" yet "differ[] in significant
respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal
theaters., 284 On the one hand:
[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. Moreover, the
capacity of a group or individual to participate in the
intellectual give and take of campus debate... [would be]
limited by denial of access to the customary media for
communicating with the administration, faculty members,
285
and other students.
Yet a university also has authority to "impose reasonable regulations
compatible with [its educational] mission upon the use of its campus
and facilities." 286 In sum, the Court seems to have categorized the
public university a "limited public forum."
Additionally, there are private fora, property not owned by the
government but by private individuals or organizations. The
importance of private fora to free speech seems to be low, relative to
traditional public fora, and the government's content-neutral
restrictions can also burden expression in private fora so long as there
are "ample alternative channels of communication of the
' 287
information."
There was some debate over whether the public nature of certain
privately-owned properties should be considered as public property to
which speakers should have access, but this seems to have been

limited public and nonpublic fora depends on the government's intent in creating the
forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). If "a

limited public forum is neither more nor less than what the government intends it to be,
then a First Amendment right of access to the forum is nothing more than the claim that
the government should be required to do what it already intends to do in any event."
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS ch. 6, at 227, originally published as

Between Government in Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, in 34

UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). Thus, in practice, a limited public forum becomes like a
nonpublic forum. Id. at 227-28. But cf. Cornelius,473 U.S. at 819 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(espousing continuing the separate notion of a limited public forum in saying, "[t]he line
between limited public forums and nonpublic forums 'may blur at the edges,' and is really
more in the nature of a continuum than a definite demarcation.").
283. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
284. Id. at 268 n 5.
285. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Id.
287. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981).
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primarily resolved in the negative.2 88 There remain two exceptions
under which privately-owned property is considered public property
for the purposes of the First Amendment: first, where the private
owner has taken on an activity that has traditionally been the
exclusive prerogative of the government, for example, running a city
or holding public elections; and second, where the government is so
entangled with the private entity as to make the two inseparable for
purposes of the First Amendment.2" 9 Both exceptions have been
29 0
severely limited over the years and are rarely invoked successfully.
The continued development of different classifications of public
fora and the exceptions used to treat private fora as public fora have
resulted in some chaos. In fact, scholars and commentators have
criticized using "forum" analysis at all and generally heaped upon it
"universal condemnation." 291 Professor Laurence Tribe points out
"the blurriness, the occasional artificiality, and the frequent
292
irrelevance, of the categories within the public forum classification."
Similarly, Professor Robert Post finds the doctrine both
constitutionally unjustified and untenable in practice. 29 3 In particular,
he describes how the theoretical and practical difficulties with the
"limited public forum" have rendered it invisible, and in a practical
system of only
sense, the Court has moved back to the two-tier
294
"traditional public fora" and "non-public fora."
In the school context in particular, "[c]ourts and commentators
are divided ...over whether judicial 'forum analysis' should apply to
regulations limiting students' personal, protected speech that occurs
on school property during school hours." 295 One case notes, "there is
well-reasoned authority counseling the court to leapfrog public forum
analysis and apply strict scrutiny to the content-based portions of the
288. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (discussing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972) and Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968)). For a discussion of this line of cases, see Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a
Public Forum? Computer Bulletin Boards,Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEO. L.J. 409,
420-28 (1992). Free expression rights of access may be different under state constitutions.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding California constitution
allowed right of access to privately-owned shopping center).
289. David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information
Superhighway (Where are the Public Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46

HASTINGS L.J. 335, 350 (1995).
290. Id. at 350-57.
291. Post, supra note 151, at 1715-16.
292. TRIBE, supra note 197, § 12-24, at 987.
293.

POST, supra note 282, at 199.

294.
295.

Id. at 219-28.
Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 288 (E.D. Penn. 1991).
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defendant school district's new policy,"2 96 but in the next breath

applies forum analysis essentially to cover itself under the confusing
precedent.2 97

Despite the difficulties and confusion, however, courts continue
298
to rely heavily on "public forum" analysis in free expression cases.
2.

Harnessingthe Limited Usefulness of "PublicForum" Analysis

Besides the general criticisms leveled at "public forum" analysis
as unworkable, 299 "public forum" analysis also runs the danger 3of
00
distracting from more important First Amendment concerns.
Professors Daniel Farber and John Nowak draw attention to this by

pointing to judicial opinions that run through an entire "public forum"
30 1
analysis even where such analysis is irrelevant to the decision.

Furthermore, they underscore the particular inadequacy of "public
forum" analysis in considering so-called "hybrid" situational
regulations that limit the content of speech
but only in the context of a
30 2
certain location, medium or speaker.

For example, the Court in Cox v. Louisiana30 3 considered a law
restricting commentary on the judicial process from public areas
adjacent to courthouses. 3 4 The Court relied on a "murky" distinction

between speech and conduct in attempting to reconcile their decision
with "public forum" doctrine. 305 But the Court should have realized
that the government has some latitude to regulate speech to protect

296. Id. at 291.
297. Id. ("Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's application of forum analysis is everexpanding, and some courts have applied a public forum analysis to Tinker speech.
Therefore, the question remains: If a forum analysis is required and if the court performs
such an analysis, is strict scrutiny of content-based regulations the appropriate standard of
review?") The court eventually concluded it would apply strict scrutiny under or not under
forum analysis, not attempting to discern whether forum analysis was necessary or useful in
this school context. Id. at 291-93.
298. See, e.g., David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber
Forum: Public vs. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) ("[A]s
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia demonstrates, the [forum] doctrine remains alive.").
299. See discussion supra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.
300. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in FirstAmendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1224
(1984); see generally id. Parts I, IV, at 1226-45, 1262-66.
301. Id. at 1223.
302. Id. at 1226, 1233-35.
303. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
304. See Farber and Nowak, supra note 300, at 1233.
305. See Id.
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the judicial process regardless of the type of fora involved. 306 The First
Amendment "protects people, not places," making overreliance on
forum analysis misleading. 30 7 Regulations of speech pertaining
specifically to the Internet likely fall under Farber's and Nowak's
"hybrid" category, so blind "public forum" analysis distracts from
rather than aids their constitutional analysis.
In the Internet context, the very nature of the Internet causes
problems with direct importation of "public forum" analysis. For
starters, no one owns the Internet.3 °8 Schools who provide Internet
access may own the computers connected to the Internet, but they do
not own the Internet. They may own a "part" of the Internet; but
Internet users can quickly "move" to a "part" of the Internet based in
a computer located on the other side of the world. Thus, it is not
necessarily the case that a school-or anyone-owns the relevant
"forum" at all. As a consequence, perhaps none of the public forum
classifications apply to the Internet.
Likewise, just "where" a communication on the Internet takes
place is unclear, engendering similar confusions. 30 9 Physically, an
Internet communication is a series of electronic data signals traveling
through the wires and computer connections comprising the Internet.
Thus, for example, if an e-mail originates in a student's personal
computer in her dormitory room in northern California, enters the
university computer system, is forwarded out of the university to a
computer network in southern California, is bounced to a computer
network in Washington, D.C., is bounced again to the computer
network at Oxford in England, and then finds its way off the Oxford
computer network to another student's personal computer, where is
the communication and what constitutes the forum? In this sense,
like telephone conversations, the mail,
Internet communications are
31 0
or perhaps cable television.
311
Nevertheless, courts seem wed to the "public forum" doctrine,
so characterization of Internet communications as taking place in
306. See Id.
307. See Id. at 1234.
308. See Harmon, supra note 41, at A7.
309. Cf. Posch, supra note 274, at 62 ("There is no equivalent place in the Web. It
cannot be legislated in the micro sense since there is no geographical nexus for netizens.").
310. For interesting discussions of applying the "public forum" doctrine to cable
television public access channels, and the complexities thus caused, see the Court's
opinions in Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
U.S. LEXIS 2374 (1996).
311. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 300, at 1221-23 ("Public forum analysis appears
to be increasing in importance.").
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"fora" necessarily becomes important. To the extent "public forum"
analysis is useful in examining expression on the Internet, schools and
courts should be wary of oversimplifying such analysis because of
insufficient understanding of the nature of the Internet. To classify the
Internet as a whole as one type of forum is probably inappropriate.
David Goldstone argues persuasively that the Internet "should not be
seen as a public or nonpublic forum, but as a more complex entity, like
a city, that contains both public and nonpublic forums [sic] within
'
it."312
Given the broad capabilities of the Internet and myriad
different uses to which it is put, this accords with common sense. Thus,
different types of Internet communications can be considered as
"taking place" in different type of fora and thus draw the scrutiny
corresponding to that forum. The most obvious way to go about
characterizing different types of Internet fora is by analogy to
traditional physical locations.
In fact, drawing analogies to traditional physical locations or
media of communication is the most useful part to be gleaned from
"public forum" analysis of the Internet. Professor Cass Sunstein
explains it best, so I quote him at length:
In fact the legal culture has no way to think about the new problems
except via analogies. The analogies are built into our very language:
e-mail, electronic bulletin boards, cyberspace, cyberspaces, and
much more.
Thus, for example, ordinary mail provides a promising foundation
on which to build the assessment of legal issues associated with
electronic mail. It is far from clear that the standards for libelous or
fraudulent communication must shift with the new technologies. To
be sure, there will be new and somewhat vexing occasions for
evaluating the old standards. Judges may not understand the novel
situations, especially those involving the Internet. In particular, the
low cost of sending and receiving electronic mail, and of sending it to
thousands or millions of people, may produce some new and
unanticipated problems and put high pressure on old categories.
Certainly it is likely that new and unanticipated problems will arise
and a degree of judicial caution is therefore desirable in invoking the
313
First Amendment.
312. Goldstone, supra note 289, at 379; see also id. at 382-83; Goldstone, supra note
298, at 10. Goldstone discounts the use of the limited public forum, but it may be
appropriate for the Internet and might solve some of his other questions about newsgroups
as public fora. See Goldstone, supra note 289, at 380 n.223.
313. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1792; see also American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Not surprisingly, much of the legal analysis of Internet-
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Accordingly, harnessing the limited usefulness of "public forum"
analysis requires analogizing Internet communications to traditional
communications taking place in traditional physical locations while
keeping a careful eye to how such analogies fit and how such analogies
fail. These analogies allow a greater understanding of the social
context of the communication being regulated as well as allowing
classification of Internet communications into fora, when that is
necessary.
IV
Approach to Case Analysis
In congealing the discussion of the previous three Parts, I propose
approaching the analysis of an educational institution's restriction of
(or disciplining of) a student's expression on the Internet by engaging
in a five-part inquiry. I then attempt greater explanation of each part
of this inquiry.
First, is the restriction a written regulation or rule promulgated by
the school? Formal, written policies and rules should be analyzed just
as any regulations of speech. Broad restrictions are likely to run into
the same vagueness and overbreadth problems university speech
codes have encountered.3 1 4
Second, what is the nature of the Internet communication?
Analogizing the Internet communication to well-established, better
understood communications, such as traditional postal service and the
like, is instructive for all subsequent analysis. However, analogies will
never be perfect and should serve only as a starting point. A careful
eye must discern the new social practices of Internet communication
and the new social context it generates.
Third, is the regulation a valid regulation of students qua
students? This in turn involves the three-part sub-inquiry into the
nature of the educational mission, the instrumental link between the
regulation and the educational mission, and the appropriate amount
of judicial deference to be accorded in the school's choice of
regulation and definition of its educational mission.
Fourth, if the answer to the third part takes the regulation outside
of the school's broad latitude to regulate students qua students, we
turn to "standard" First Amendment analysis: Does the regulation
target the message or viewpoint of the speaker, that is, is it a contentrelated issues has focused on seeking a familiar analogy for the unfamiliar.... This case,
too, depends on the appropriate analogy.").
314. See discussion supra Part l1.D.
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based regulation? If so, under standard First Amendment analysis, it
must pass strict scrutiny, that is, be justified by a compelling interest of
the school and narrowly tailored to that interest.
Fifth, if the regulation is content-neutral, in what type of fora
does it occur? The physical analogies investigated earlier will also
prove helpful here, in guiding the direction of "public forum" analysis.
Again, however, analogies will never be perfect and therefore should
not be blindly dispositive, for example, in wedding a particular
Internet communication to a particular analogy and its corresponding
"public forum" classification.
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth

Thus far, the analysis of broad, formal policies limiting speech in
public educational institutions has followed standard discussions of
vagueness and overbreadth. 315 Likewise, the analysis of broad, formal
policies limiting speech on the Internet has followed standard
discussions of vagueness and overbreadth. 16 Apparently, the context
of the school and the context of the Internet, separately or in
combination, do not raise novel issues for analyzing the facial validity
of such policies. Therefore, so long as the courts continue on this path,
317
there is little to add to the discussion here.
B. Understanding the Nature of Internet Communications

Understanding the nature of the Internet communication being
regulated is a prerequisite to undertaking any First Amendment
analysis with the possible exception of vagueness and overbreadth
concerns. For example, in determining whether a regulation is a valid
regulation of students qua students, an understanding of just what is
being regulated is needed to be able to determine whether there is a
connection between the regulation and the educational mission.
Analogies to traditional forms of communication, such as the U.S.
Postal Service, are often a good starting point. Schools and courts are

315. See discussion supra Part lI.D.
316. See supra notes 266-268 and accompanying text (discussing the unconstitutionality
of Communications Decency Act).
317. However, some commentators have argued that the context of the school should
change analysis of overbreadth or vagueness. For example, Professor J. Peter Byrne argues
that "the university can be trusted to administer rules prohibiting racial insults because it
has the proper moral basis and adequate expertise to do so" and therefore "vagueness
concerns about such university rules are largely misplaced." Byrne, supra note 151, at 44142.
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often more familiar with these than the Internet. Some likely
analogies are noted in the following table:

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

E-MAIL

•
*
*
•

TALK/WRITE

*

*
*
*
PERSONAL
DISPLAYS
(Web sites,
plans)

POSTING

*
*

finger

*
*
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Postal Service mail
Other mail, messaging, and
courier services
Hand-delivered note or letter
Fax
Telephone
Fax
Hand-delivered note or letter
Passing notes
Dial-in telephone service
Sign
Voicemail outgoing message
Book

Bulletin board
* Newsletter
* Speaking in a public square
However, Internet communications defy simple classification.
The multiple possible analogies listed for each type of Internet
communication indicate that the Internet communication shares
commonalties with each possible analogy, not that it can be translated
directly and fully as any one of those analogies.
For example, in the table above, U.S. Postal Service mail seems at
first blush an adequate analogy to e-mail. However, the analogy does
not always work because the ease with which one can send e-mail
differs from that' of sending U.S. Postal Service mail. In a case
involving a former student, the issue of whether an e-mailed
communication constitutes a credible threat may hinge on how much
effort the former student had to expend in sending the e-mails. 318 In
that case, the prosecuting attorney argued that:
*

[T]he threat was credible ... because [the former student] had to
manually type the e-mail address of each recipient. It's as if he had
typed and made numerous copies of one threatening letter, manually

addressed each of the envelopes to his targeted victim 19and then
dropped the bundle of letters in the mail on the same day.
Of course, the former student did not have to manually address

envelopes. Moreover, looking up e-mail addresses was probably much
318.

Davan Maharaj, E-mail Hate Case Tests Free Speech Protections,L.A. TIMES, July

8, 1997, at Al (paraphrasing and quoting Michael Gennaco, Assistant U.S. Attorney)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
319. Id.
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easier and faster than looking up mailing addresses, and the former
student may have had only to copy and paste the e-mail addresses
rather than typing them. Another lawyer commented:
The 'Net offers some characteristics that are not present in the mail
stream or the phone.... If [the former student's] attorney can show
that dozens of people were party to this communication, then he
could possibly claim it's akin to a guy standing
in the middle of the
320
street yelling idle-and harmless-threats.
The arguments become complicated; in this particular case, the
321
former student was convicted by a jury.
On the same note, none of the analogies listed in the table above
for "personal displays" quite covers Internet communication. Personal
displays are like a dial-in telephone service in that the receiver of the
message must take affirmative steps to obtain the message, rather
than happening upon it. Since personal displays can be interactive or
allow for the receiver of the message to leave a responding message,
they are somewhat like voicemail or answering machines. But since
personal displays typically contain visual elements not present in any
type of telephone communication, they are also like signs, perhaps
hung on the communicator's door or window-however, signs can
"surprise" passersby unlike personal displays and may not be as
accessible from as far away or to as broad an audience as Internet
personal displays.
The following example illustrates exactly why schools and courts
should be wary of relying on analogies too much. At Boston College,
an administrator explained the school would treat a student home
page on the World Wide Web "just like a sign hanging from a
dormitory window." 32 2 Thus, while a "listener" in this situation must
take affirmative steps to access a home page, including specifically
choosing to access a particular home page, as opposed to. a passerby
who may have little choice but to be exposed to the message on a sign
hanging from a window, Boston College indicates it will treat the two
different "speakers" the same.
Consider further that a Web page may have many layers. That is,
a "listener" would "tune in" to the Web site and be met by the first
introductory Web page, often termed the "home page." A viewer
could then move to the rest of the Web site by clicking on the buttons

320. Id. (quoting Andrew H. Good) (internal quotation marks omitted).
321. California Case is First Online Hate-mail Conviction, NEWSBYTES, Feb. 12, 1998.
322. Nathan Cobb, Cyberspace on Campus: New Access and Excess, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 16, 1995, at 1.
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that link to other parts (or "pages") of the Web site. In this sense, the
Web site is too complicated to be a sign; it is more like a book.
Moreover, sites containing potentially objectionable material will
often disclose this up front, on the home page, so someone who does
not wish to view the material can decline to do so. Thus, if Boston
College wished to regulate obscene material on student Web pages,
the "sign hanging from a dormitory window" analogy is even further
askew. A blown-up pornographic picture draped down from a
dormitory window for all to see is quite a different thing than
pornographic computer images viewed on a personal computer in the
viewer's room after she clicked "Yes" in response to the question of
whether she wanted to see pornography. In sum, the problems with
Boston College's imprecise analogy are of constitutional magnitude. 23
In such a situation, a school should go on to consider the social
practices involved in the communication and the purpose of the
regulation. If the purpose of the regulation is to protect adults who do
no wish to view pornography from having to do so, and thus maintain
their comfort levels and improve the educational environment, then
the sign analogy is clearly inappropriate. In this scenario, the web site
is more appropriately thought of as a dial-in telephone service with a
menu to reach certain information. The fact that the information is
visual as well as audio is not important to the regulation at issue, so
the analogy works fairly well.
Of course, the Internet's unique attributes will create
communicative contexts quite unlike any traditional form of
communication. For instance, private e-mail messages can be
forwarded to many other recipients instantly, with barely a touch of a
button. This has the practical effect of making the message reach
many people, similar to a posting in a public newsgroup or on a public
bulletin board. The original sender might then be held responsible for
having sent an unsolicited communication to a private individual
whom the message reached or be considered to have posted it in a
public or semi-public place.
In some ways this is like a physical chain letter, or like the case
where a person photocopies a letter she receives and mails the copies
along to many others. But the ease in which this can be done on the
323. Cf. Sable Communications v. FCC, 429 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (using a similar
analysis of having to take affirmative steps to be exposed to a message to differentiate a
dial-in service from radio broadcasting). The Supreme Court seemed to recognize the
analogy of a Web page to a dial-in service in saying, "Each [Web page] has its own
address- 'rather like a telephone number."' Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S. Ct. 2329,
2335.(1997).
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Internet makes it qualitatively different. A speaker has some idea that
a person would have to go to some amount of trouble to photocopy a
letter, and then address and stamp a number of envelopes, and then
stuff the envelopes with the photocopies, and then put them all in the
mail. Thus, the intent of the sender may have not been to achieve this
promulgation at all. If such "innocence" of intent can be shown, the
situation is like a person telling her secret to a friend who surprisingly
betrays her confidence, by telling the secret to everyone. Thus, such
private Internet messages should also be considered to be private in
every sense.
However, such "innocence" of intent may be very difficult to
show. People familiar with the Internet are aware that messages are
easily forwarded. In some cases, it may appear that the message
sender knew that the message could or would be forwarded to many
others. Analogously, a person telling her friend a joke may expect or
reasonably anticipate that her friend might tell other people the joke.
In a more extreme case, a person who is deliberately spreading rumors
might actually intend that every person to whom she tells a rumor
spread that rumor further. In such situations on the Internet, what
starts out as a private Internet message should be considered public
communication.
Nevertheless, knowledge that a message can be forwarded should
not automatically be considered constructive knowledge that every
message is likely to be forwarded, just as it should not be so
considered for conversations in person or over the phone. Otherwise,
or express
every communication would have to bear a disclaimer
324
instructions not to forward the message any further.
If that were not enough, the Internet's unique attributes create
not only unique communicative contexts but also unique social
contexts. People do not interact with each other the same way on the
Internet as they do in "real" life; accordingly, their expectations within
the Internet are also different. For example, many people understand
the ease with which a speaker can put information on the Internet and
that they often have no way of discerning the identity, credibility, or
reputation of the speaker. That is, if you find a Web page titled, "Dr.
Sally Li's Medical Advice and Home Remedies," you have no idea
and possibly no way of determining whether Dr. Sally Li is actually a
324. Interestingly, where communications have larger legal consequences, persons are
including just such instructions and disclaimers in every e-mail message. Law firms in
particular are increasingly programming their computers to automatically append such a
warning at the bottom of all e-mails which leave the office. This practice has not become
common practice for everyday Internet communicators though.

810
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Stanford M.D., an herbal medicinist, or a ten-year old boy in Jackson,
Tennessee. Thus, many people have learned to treat the Internet with
a sense of healthy mistrust.3 25
This anonymity and ease of "speaking" on the Internet have also
dulled senses of decor in that it is more commonplace and even
accepted to be rude and insulting. A term called "flaming" has even
sprung to being; it indicates a vicious tongue-lashing.3 26 As Sara
Kiesler, a Carnegie Mellon professor of social science, tells it, a flame
"is a common way to vent on the Internet, even among grown-ups and
Harvard professors. 3 2 7 "People say things on the Internet they
wouldn't say otherwise."3 2 8 In turn, people do not treat what they
read, hear, or receive on the Internet the same way they would
something told them in-person, on the phone, in a letter or that they
read in a newspaper or see on television.
As can be seen, Internet communications can stretch analogies
past their limit. In sum, every Internet communication must be
examined not only through analogy but also in light of the new social
practices surrounding it and the resulting new social context in which
it takes place.
C.

Regulation of Students Qua Students
Public schools have broad latitude to regulate students qua

students in furtherance of their educational mission. Determining
whether a particular regulation is a valid regulation of students qua
325. "Consideration also has to be given to the fact that readers of Internet postings
are not mindless automatons .... [they should know] public postings on the Internet aren't
any more reliable than fliers on telephone poles." Terry Roach, Editorial, Letter to the
Editor: U. of Md., We Can't Police the Internet, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1996, at A20 (written
by Terry Roach, Chief Counsel for the University of Maryland at College Park, and Gary
Pavela, Director of the University's judicial programs). In fact, readers of Internet postings
have learned public postings on the Internet may be less reliable than fliers on telephone
poles. See Mary Leonard, Taming the Beast, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 1998, at C1 ("The
biggest rap on the Internet's virtual reality is that it isn't real. People can't trust it.").
326. A newspaper article defined a "flame" as "an Internet term for abusive or
insulting e-mail." Julie Chao, E-mail Conviction's Impact Downplayed, S.F. EXAMINER,
Feb. 12, 1998, at A10.
327. Id. (quoting Sara Kiesler). Some experts go so far as saying "people who log into a
computer network accept the risks of encountering inflammatory speech, because the
Internet is a domain where talk is cheap and 'flame wars'-or vitriolic exchanges among
computer users-are commonplace." Maharaj, supra note 318, at Al.
328. Maharaj, supra note 318, at Al.; The anonymity and cover of an on-line therapy
group even prompted one man to confess to murdering his five-year-old daughter by
burning her alive in the family home in an effort to escape a custody dispute with his exwife. See Amy Harman, Alarming Confession on the Net, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 1998, at
Al.
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students in furtherance of the educational mission demands a threepart inquiry: (1) the nature of the educational mission to be furthered
by regulation; (2) the instrumental connection of the regulation to the
furtherance of the educational mission; and (3) the amount of judicial
deference to be accorded to the school in regard to its characterization
of its educational mission and/or its choice of means to further that
mission.

329

In regard to the first step, the nature of the educational mission at
issue may be general, such as preventing direct disruption to the
operation of the school or otherwise preventing activities which
undermine the ability of the school to carry out its educational
mission. The educational mission may also be characterized under
theoretical frameworks such as civic education, democratic education,
or critical education, as discussed earlier. 330 Moreover, there may be
multiple objectives of the educational mission that may be in tension
with each other. For example, democratic education's commitment to
participation and critical education's relentless pursuit of "truth" may
often come into conflict with civic education's occasional need to
suppress certain types of speech for the purpose of civil discourse.
Examining the instrumental connection between the educational
mission to be furthered and the means of the regulation may also
require examination of the breadth or scope of the regulation. Schools
"may have various educational functions with constitutionally distinct
characteristics. Thus it is conceivable that public [schools] may be
permitted to pursue the mission of civic education within their
dormitories, but be required to follow the requirements of democratic
education with regard to their open spaces." 331 In other words, a
regulation of speech within dormitories may have a very strong
connection to furthering a school's mission of civic education, and
override competing educational goals; but that same regulation
applied in open spaces may have a weaker connection to civic
education, or fare worse when balanced against competing
educational goals. On a similar train of thought, a regulation that
applies to students completely outside school grounds may have a
difficult time showing the requisite connection to the educational
332
mission.
329. See discussion supra notes 142-178 and accompanying text.
330. See discussion supra notes 156-163 and accompanying text.
331. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 151, at 325.
332.. Some courts seem to place considerable emphasis on when. restrictions reach
outside school grounds: "Here, because school officials have ventured out of the school
yard and into the general community where the freedom accorded expression is at its
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Determining the proper amount of judicial deference to grant the
school operates in conjunction with examination of the educational
mission and the means. Where the subject of regulation "requires
insulation from routine judicial oversight for its effective
' the court should defer to the
functioning,"3 33
judgments of the school
as much as possible. On the opposite extreme, where a school
characterizes a regulation of viewpoint or political speech as a
necessary part of its educational mission, the courts should step in
readily.33 4
In the case of public educational institutions restricting
expressions of their students on the Internet, several most-likely
scenarios come to mind. Possible goals of the educational mission in
such scenarios are: (1) prevention of material disruption to the
operation of the school and to the educational environment; (2)
maintenance of the credibility of and high regard for the school in
speech it affirmatively sponsors or promotes; and (3) inculcation of
civility and civic values as preparation for citizenship ("civic
zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind government officials in
the public arena. Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050
(2d Cir. 1979). Some school officials and attorneys in the Internet student-speech cases
have echoed these thoughts. One school superintendent said, "We can't punish something
that didn't take place in school." Rogers, supra note 97, at Al (quoting Superintendent
Murray Blueglass). Likewise, a law professor agreed: "Somebody outside of school
certainly has full First Amendment rights on what he does on his own computer." Id.
(quoting Rutgers law professor Jonathan Mallamud). Likewise, in the Sean O'Brien case
discussed above, O'Brien's attorney compared the situation to "Sean talking to his friends
in a coffee shop. Why can't he say something critical of the band teacher? He's on his own
time, he's on his own turf." Banned Student Targets School's Band Director,supra note 7,
at B2.
As noted, I agree that a regulation that reaches outside school grounds is less likely to
be sufficiently connected to the educational mission to pass constitutional muster.
However, I would not draw the bright line between in-school and out-of-school that these
comments suggest. For starters, a Web page is not like a coffee-shop conversation in that it
can reach into the school grounds. Students could feasibly access the Web page from the
school computer lab. In that way, a Web page is more like a student handing out flyers on
school grounds. Thus, Internet expressions should not be so strongly tied to the computer
from which they originated or where they are stored. Moreover, schools do have the
authority to regulate behavior outside the school under certain circumstances where
students are acting in their capacity as students, i.e., they may regulate students qua
students. For example,. students who go to an away football game and start fights in the
bleachers are likely subject to discipline by their school, even though the behavior took
place at another school.
333. Post, Between Governance,supra note 151, at 1783.
334. Id. at 1815 ("In fact the Court has given serious recognition to only one
constitutional value that could potentially override warranted deference, and that is the
value involved in prohibiting government institutions from making their resources
available to the public in a manner that discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.").
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education").335 Again, each of these will often be in some tension with
other educational goals, such as participation, tolerance of speech, and
criticism in pursuit of "truth."
The potential for disruption of the educational environment is a
very real problem with student expression on the Internet.3 3 6
Disruption could come through an abuse of Internet resources

overloading a computer system and slowing or halting the Internet
activities of others or through inflammatory communications that
create a hostile environment. Such "virtual"3 3' 7 disruptions stretch the

traditional physical paradigm of "disruptions" in case precedent.338
For the first case, the abuse of Internet resources overloading
computer systems does fit into a physical paradigm. Computer systems
are physical in nature, and even the idea of overloading a system has
many obvious physical analogies. Furthermore, the consequences of
such abuses have readily tangible forms. For example, a computer
system could crash as a result of a student's perpetuation of myriad

electronic chain letters, and this might cause a number of students to
be unable to complete homework assignments requiring use of the
Internet.

339

Thus, a prohibition on electronic chain letters or limiting a
student to sending one hundred or less e-mails per day has a strong

connection to preventing disruption to the operation of the school.
Moreover, the court is not in a good position to second-guess the
school's assessment of its computer system's ability to handle many email messages or the likely e-mail needs of its students, so it should

335. Other goals are possible, of course. Unstated as obvious is the goal of education in
and of itself, including control of the curriculum, grading, and the general academic and
educational process itself. Courts have left such controls in the hands of the school
exclusively almost without fail; for example, a student cannot assert a First Amendment
right to write an assigned research paper on an unapproved topic. See generally Settle v.
Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995).
336. See. Kovaleski, supra note 6, at C1 ("Students who belong to radical groups ... are
using school Internet access to spread their dogma through cyberspace . . . . 'This is
becoming one of the major battlefields in spreading racial intolerance and hate, as well as
violence and mayhem."').
337. "Virtual" in the context of the Internet and cyberspace has become a buzz word
removed from its original context in the term "virtual reality."
338. E.g., Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees of Insts. of Higher Learning, 620
F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1980).
339. Cf. Thomas Healy, Students' Web Pages Prove a Sticky Snare for Many
Universities, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 16, 1996, at Al (student's Web
page featuring photos of supermodel Angie Everhart "was visited by so many people that
it ... nearly crippled one of the school's computer servers. Students had trouble accessing
their web pages, and several computer classes were interrupted.").
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give wide deference to the school's judgments. In sum, such
regulations are valid regulations of students qua students.
A student might argue that the school should not have the ability
to limit access to its computer resources, because it harms the
student's ability to communicate in the increasingly important
medium of the Internet. However, the argument falters if the
limitation is emplaced only to prevent system crashes, which would
eliminate access for everyone. Furthermore, a student has many
avenues for gaining access to the Internet besides through the school
computer systems. She may sign up with an independent Internet
service provider (ISP) and access the Internet from her own personal
computer without relying on the school's computers at all.
Inflammatory communications on the Internet are a trickier case
of disruption. The exact disruption is hard to predict or measure.
Tinker allows schools latitude to prevent expression that would
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. 3 40 Additionally,
schools must have some substantial basis for believing a material
disruption will take place where they act in a preventive or regulatory
manner before the expression has taken place; an "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension" is insufficient.341
Where the student Internet communication bears directly on class
or curricular activities, disruption is much easier to show. An Internet
newsgroup dedicated to class discussion needs norms of
communication to allow the class discussion to proceed. Thus, a school
could prohibit students from posting messages completely unrelated
to class discussions; for example selling a used futon, or prohibit
students from making unwarranted use of profanity. Such restrictions
would be strongly linked to the educational mission.
However, the myriad personal communications students send out
over the Internet are more complicated. A student sending an e-mail
to another student threatening to physically harm that student is quite
like a student who threatens another student outside of the Internet;
schools must afford their students some degree of safety and comfort
to create an environment conducive to learning, by being able to
discipline threats.3 42 But if a student posts a message to a public, open340. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); see
discussion supra Part II.B.1.
341. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189-91 (1972) (lack of
basis for believing a student club posed a threat of material disruption to the school
precluded university from withholding approval of club).
342. Moreover, threats are not protected speech in the first place. See, e.g., Lovell v.
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ended, non-class-based newsgroup that politely tells why she thinks
the Holocaust never happened, the disruption is more subtle. There is
not a physical threat, and there is not a threat directed at a single
person. Yet, there is some harm to the learning environment in that
many people will be offended by the message and feel less
comfortable.
However, the courts have made clear that mere "discomfort and
unpleasantness" is insufficient, especially in light of the goals of
democratic education.343 Tinker has laid out only a limited deference
to be given the school authorities. Therefore, regulation of that
message is probably not linked strongly enough to the prevention of
disruption to be a valid regulation of students.qua students.
Even trickier, the maintenance of the credibility of and high
regard for the school in speech a school affirmatively sponsors or
promotes becomes extremely complex in the context of student
Internet expressions. Hazelwood School Districtgave wide latitude for
public schools to "refuse to lend its name and resources to the
dissemination of student

expression." 3"

Again, the names of

educational institutions are often attached to any Internet expressions
by its students. 45 Thus, a school could attempt to place almost any
manner of restriction on student Internet expressions made through
school accounts by claiming furtherance of its mission to uphold its
good name, credibility, and reputation which allow it to fulfill its "role
as a principal instrument in awakening [students] to cultural values
",346

However, this is very different from the situation in Hazelwood.
In Hazelwood, the medium was a student newspaper that was part of
the curriculum, produced through a regular class and under direct and
constant supervision from teachers.3 47 Only under these circumstances
were "school officials.., entitled to regulate the contents of [the

Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Threats of physical violence
are not protected by the First Amendment under either federal or state law, and as a
result, it does not matter to our analysis that [the plaintiff] uttered her comments while at
school.").

343. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
344. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
345. See discussion supra Part II.A.
346. Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Prokop, supra note 45, at
2550 (discussing university interest in maintaining its reputation and image in its
community, as raised by the decision in Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th
Cir. 1972)).
347. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-63, 268-69.
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newspaper] in any reasonable manner" 348; that is, under those

circumstances, regulation of the content of the newspaper was a valid
regulation of students qua students. The lending of the school's name
as part of providing Internet service is a far cry from a curricular
newspaper for which the school lends its faculty time and supervision
and pays for printing and distribution. For example, the variable cost

to the school for a student to send e-mails over the course of an entire
year is negligible compared to the resources it would have to
separately commit for a student newspaper.
Even aside from Hazelwood, however, courts have recognized
that schools have a legitimate concern over whether expressions are
attributed to them. For example, while courts have generally
protected the opinions of teachers expressed outside of the classroom,
they allow that in certain situations the problems of misattribution and
confusion merit some authority of schools to regulate such
expressions. 349 Thus, where Internet communications create a
legitimate problem of misattributing a person's expressions to the
school as an institution, there is precedent for allowing more
restriction on Internet speech. Virginia Tech seems to agree: It takes
"the position that if you use our [computer] server, then you have
some responsibilities350because you associate the name of the institution
with what you say."
However, the appearance of the school's name as part of a
person's account name and address by and large will not create such
problems. Internet users understand that university e-mail accounts
are used by individuals and do not generally reflect expressions
endorsed by or attributable to the university. The appropriate analogy
is the U.S. postal service. By my listing "Oakland, CA" as part of my
return address on an envelope or a flyer I post in the middle of
campus, no one considers my views as those of the city of Oakland.
Similarly, I may receive mail at a student organization office at the
348. Id. at 270.
349. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[T]here lies some
authority over the conduct of teachers in and out of the classroom . . . that gives the
appearance of endorsement by the university.").
350. Bytes and Pieces: Free Speech and the Internet, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK
DAILY REPORT CARD, Oct. 25, 1995, at 7 (quoting Cathryn Goree, Dean of Students at
Virginia Tech) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Serge F. Kovaleski, Universities
Vexed by Use of Their Internet Connections for Hate Mail, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1995, at

A4 ("By having an educational institution's name listed on the header of an Internet
posting, authors say they can give the appearance that their messages are endorsed by
reputable schools-when in fact they are not-and that they carry credibility in
mainstream thinking.").

1998]

TYPE No EVIL

University of California, Berkeley and list as part of my return address
for communications on behalf of that student organization, "Name of
Student Organization, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley"; again, those views will properly be attributed to
me and/or the student organization rather than the school as a whole.
Likewise, e-mail from "ice@cs.stanford.edu" expresses the views of
the person whose account name is "ice" rather than those of Stanford
University. In general, unless a person identifies herself as an official
employee, particularly an administrator or other spokesperson, of the
educational institution, no reasonable person351 is likely to interpret
the presence of the school name in the address as an endorsement by
the school.352
Thus, given the social connotations of Internet communications,
regulation of Internet speech solely to protect the name of the school
should be accorded little deference, and the connection found too
tenuous to be a valid regulation of students qua students.
As a final example, the inculcation of civility and civic values is
the "civic education" discussed by Professor Post353 and the overriding
educational mission found in Bethel School District v. Fraser.354 For
example, a public school might prohibit lewd or indecent speech in all
Internet communications by its students to promote the lessons of
"civil, mature conduct., 355 Ignoring, for the moment, any problems of
vagueness or overbreadth, the regulation is likely overinclusive, thus
weakening the instrumental connection between it and the civic
mission. Prohibiting a student from making gratuitous use of filthy
language in a message she posts to a newsgroup dedicated to
furthering class discussions probably promotes "civil, mature
conduct." It assumably teaches the student that such language is
inappropriate in certain contexts and mostly unhelpful in intellectual
discussion. However, prohibiting that same student from sending a
personal e-mail containing sexual innuendo to her twenty-one-year351. The "reasonable person" here is assumed to have at least a slight working
knowledge of the Internet. See discussion supra note 325 and accompanying text.
352. Concededly, the analogies are not perfect. In particular, affiliation with a school
connotes much more than affiliation with a city from living there. In the e-mail context,
affiliation with the school implies you are an employee of the school or a student attending
the school. However, this alone is insufficient to justify infringing on First Amendment
rights. Only when the communication raises the danger of misattribution or gives the
appearance of school endorsement should the school have more latitude to divorce itself
from the expression.
353. See discussion supra notes 156-58.
354. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
355. Cf.id. at 683.
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old next-door neighbor in the dormitory may be too strong a
medicine, thus dulling the lesson; it might teach that such language is
never acceptable under any circumstances or that one should be
always fearful about what one says, even in private.
Thus, this broad of a regulation would probably be too weakly
connected to the goal of civic education to be a valid regulation of
students qua students. It would be more likely to pass muster if it
prohibited lewd or indecent speech only in newsgroups dedicated to
class discussions, similar to the prevention of disruption example
above. Still, there may be a class newsgroup for a class which studies
pornography, for which a robust discussion would necessarily refer to
and thereby include lewd and indecent speech. This raises the
competing goals of democratic and/or critical education, which would
demand the inclusion of such lewd and indecent speech under these
circumstances.
Of course, an often-found corollary to the inculcation of civic
values is the goal of protecting minors from obscene speech, typically
in secondary or lower schools. The Court's decisions in Bethel356 and
Kuhlmeier3 57 indicate a preoccupation with the school's latitude to
protect younger students from objectionable or mature material.3 58
Schools have greater ability to restrict student expression when that
expression is directed toward or readily available to younger students
and the expression is less suited to younger students. In contrast, the
term "motherfucker" in a political cartoon distributed to college-age
students was constitutionally protected by the Court's decision in
359
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri.
This indicates that civic education is a very strong, important goal
in secondary and lower schools and therefore overrides goals of
democratic or critical education when it comes to prohibiting lewd or
indecent speech. Courts should give considerable deference to
secondary and lower schools' judgments about civic education. In the
university setting, however, there is an implicit assumption that the
students have already learned the basic civic lessons; thus, at that
stage, the goals of democratic and critical education become more

356. Id. at 675 (allowing school to punish student who gave an indecent speech in front
of much of the school in part because of concern for younger audience members).
357. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (allowing school to censor
newspaper articles on pregnancy and birth control in part because of concern for younger
readers).
358. See discussion supra Part I.B..1.

359. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
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important and would be more likely to outweigh goals of civic
education.
D. "Standard" First Amendment Analysis
Under "standard" First Amendment analysis, the threshold

question is of course whether the regulation targets the message or
viewpoint of the speaker. Such content-based regulations must be
justified by a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to that

interest.
A public school

would have more

latitude, however, to

promulgate content-neutral regulations affecting student expression
on the Internet. Once a regulation is found to be content-neutral,
courts apply "forum" analysis. Regulations of expression in public
360
fora must be necessary to serve significant government interests.

Regulations of expression in non-public fora must be necessary to
serve a significant government interest if the interference with speech
is substantial or serve a rational government interest if the
interference is not substantial. 361 the availability of adequate
alternative channels of communication can render interference
insubstantial. 362 Finally, regulations which affect expression in private
fora are acceptable unless they leave no adequate alternative channels
of communication.3 6 3

As discussed earlier, the classification of Internet
communications into these fora classifications is an imprecise science
at best. Nevertheless, analogies to
traditional physical
communications can be helpful. Using some of the analogies discussed
previously "private communications between' ititual and willing

participants analogize most easily to private mail and should be
considered a private forum belonging to the participants."'

364

The

360. See generally TRIBE, supra note 197, § 27, at 987.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See generally id.. § 12-25, at 998-1003.
364. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 289 (discussing private communications in the context
of a conference and the exclusion of others from that conference); see also David Johnston,
There is No Sheriff on the Cyber-Frontier,MONTREAL GAZETTE, June 18, 1995, at D10
(Gareth Sansom, Industry Canada policy advisor, notes, "E-mail on the Internet (personto-person communication) would generally fall into the private sphere .... "); Larry
Wheeler, Web Page Airs NASA's Dirty Laundry, MORNING NEws TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.),
May 12, 1996, at A6 (Professor Donald Berman asks, regardiig a Web page, "Let's forget
about computers and pretend it really is a water cooler and you have a bunch of NASA
employees standing around and talking about how upset they are about layoffs,... Do
they have a right to engage in that type of conversation? If the answer is 'yes,' then the
question becomes, should it matter if they go outside the office to carry on the same
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involvement of the school or government as a mail deliverer is

nominal.
Private communications where one party is not expecting the
communication and/or is unwilling to receive the communication are
somewhat different. Such situations are often analogous to receiving
junk mail, advertising circulars, or political mail, and should be
governed similarly.3 65 However, there is of course a point at which

such communications are too personal to be considered junk mail, so
frequent as to constitute harassment, or so offensive as to be
considered threatening. 66 Schools and governments can, of course,
regulate under these circumstances.
Public communications are rather different. Many newsgroups
inviting the free and open posting of communications are so public

and accessible that they should be considered public fora.3 67 David
Goldstone is instructive as he spells out at length how to apply public
forum analysis to fora on the Internet.3 68 His definition of a public
forum on the Internet is a forum that: "(1) is owned or controlled by

the government; (2) is operated in a non-profit manner; (3) provides
unrestricted access for message recipients, and (4) has viewpoint369
neutral access to a reasonably large number of message senders."

Many newsgroups are operated out of computer systems owned or
controlled by the government or public educational institutions; these
newsgroups also operate without profit and provide unrestricted,
viewpoint-neutral access. These newsgroups should be considered
public fora.

conversation?").
365. See Amy Harmon, Student's Expulsion Over E-Mail Use Raises Concerns, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at 1 ("Civil libertarians ... note[] one can simply not read unwanted
e-mail."). Whether one can simply not read unwanted e-mail the way one can toss junk
mail in the trash without opening it is debatable. Before one "opens" and reads, one can
typically see the e-mail address and/or real name of the sender and a subject header. Thus,
in some ways, unwanted e-mail is easily identified, because one can see if the sender is a
stranger and/or if the subject header has nothing to do with one's interests. However, like
junk mail in plainly marked envelopes, it is not always clear whether a sender is a stranger,
or an "unwanted" stranger, and subject headers may not reveal content.
366. See generally David K. McGraw, Note, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The
Problem of Unwelcome E-Mail, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 491 (1995); Anne
W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First
Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639 (1995).
367. See Goldstone, supra note 289, at 379-80; see also Johnston, supra note 364, at D10
("[M]essages on computer bulletin boards, which have a wider readership, could be
construed as part of the public sphere ....).
368. See Goldstone, supra note 289, at 383-402.
369. Id. at 388.
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Of course, there are gray areas between strictly private and
strictly public communications on the Internet.3 7 ° Private newsgroups
and mailing lists may arbitrarily restrict who may view the messages
and discussions therein. 37 1 However, they may also be operated out of
a computer system belonging to a government or public school.
Furthermore, they are not as clearly exclusive as a conference held
within the confines of a person's home. For example, it is not always
easy to restrict who may send messages to the private newsgroup or
mailing list, and thus, the private discussion might be intruded upon by
outsiders fairly easily. As these private discussion groups are not
designated for public communications 372 and do not meet the
Goldstone definition of an Internet public forum, 373 they should also
be considered the private fora of the discussion group members. Still,
374
"they do not fit neatly into any established First Amendment box."
Many newsgroups are not private but are topical and intended to
be restricted to discussions centered on that topic, though anyone is
welcome to participate. 375 These too fail the Goldstone definition of
an Internet public forum. However, they sound very much like the
limited public fora that are open for the use of certain expressive
activities. 376 Accordingly, these newsgroups fall in the in-between
ground of limited public fora. 377 Class newsgroups, for example,
analogize to classroom discussions continued after class, and should be
378
considered limited public fora.
370. Cf.Johnston, supra note 364, at D10. Johnston quotes Gareth Sansom, an Industry
Canada policy advisor and author of a federal study on the Internet, "If you have 10
people, all friends, and one of them operates the bulletin board out of his basement, is it
public or private? A lot hinges on the distinction between public and private, and this

presents questions when you move into the electronic realm."
371. See id. ("[I]t may depend on whether the BBS (bulletin board) is a closed-user
group or an open-user group.").
372. See supra text accompanying note 279; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
373. See supra text accompanying note 369.
374. Goldstone, supra note 298, at 18.
375. See generally VIRGINIA SHEA, NETIQUETrE (Albion 1996).

376. See supra notes 280, 282, 370 and accompanying text; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
at 45-46.
377. This raises the problem of what the practical effect of a limited public forum is,
which may be that it is the same as a nonpublic forum. See supra Part III.B.2. However,
this problem is in large part due to the distinction between a limited public forum and a
nonpublic forum being based on the intent of the government. Id. This intent-based
difficulty might not arise in the context of Internet newsgroups, where the name of the
newsgroup and sometimes its first few messages give a fairly clear indication of what the
topic of the newsgroup is to be and the access to the non-physical forum is usually
unfettered for any Internet user.
378. Cf.Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment:
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Finally, when using analogies to classify Internet communications
into a particular type of forum, analysis must again consider both how
the analogy corresponds to the analogized physical means of
communication and how it differs, to avoid premature, inappropriate,
or unnecessary classification into fora.
V
Case Examples-What They Should Have Considered
In this Part, I apply my approach to case analysis to three real
situations in which a student was punished by his school for his
expression on the Internet to outline some First Amendment concerns
that may have been overlooked by the school in each case.
Concededly, my access to all the facts was limited, so I fill in with
conjecture and speculation out of necessity and for illustration.
A. The Infamous Jake Baker

In January 1995, a twenty-year-old sophomore at the University
of Michigan named Jake Baker wrote a perverse story in which he and
his friend break into a girl's apartment and proceed to torture, rape,
mutilate, and ultimately murder her by dousing her with gasoline and
lighting her on fire.379 The name of the victim was the same as a real

classmate of Jake Baker's, who sat in his Japanese class the previous
semester and on whom he had a crush.38 ° Baker posted the story to
the alt.sex.stories newsgroup, an Internet-wide discussion group with
"no imposed boundaries-just a loose culture of sex-talk in which
almost anything goes."381 The story eventually came to the attention
3 82
of university officials.

University officers contacted Baker, and he allowed them to
search his room and e-mail account.383 On February 2, 1995, university
officers, armed, were waiting for Baker outside of class. 384 They
notified him he was suspended, escorted him to his dormitory room to
Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 714 n.136 (1990) ("[E]ducation
theory suggests that most classrooms should be comprehensively protected limited public
forums.").
379. JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 63-66
(1996). See generally Jake Baker Information Page, supra note 35. The full text of the story
in question is available on the World Wide Web. See Doe (visited Dec. 29, 1996)
<http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/pjswan/Baker/stories/doe.html>.
380. WALLACE & MANGAN, supra note 379, at 66.
381. Id. at 65.

382. See id. at 63.
383. Id. at 66.
384.

Id. at 67; see also Garvey, supranote 36, at H1.
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allow him to pick up a few of his belongings, and dropped him off at
the edge of campus, telling him not to return; the university president
had suspended Baker without a hearing using a little-known bylaw
which authorized the action in the name of maintaining "health,
diligence, and order among the students., 38 5 The university
eventually
386
suspension.
the
upheld
and
hearings
held suspension
Baker's communication was a posting to an Internet newsgroup.
The newsgroup in question is public and open and accessible from
virtually "anywhere" on the Internet. The physical analogies might be
Baker posting his story on a world-accessible bulletin board devoted
to sex topics, or perhaps publishing it in a global or national sex
magazine. Control and ownership of the newsgroup are quite outside
the purview of the school.
With this as the backdrop, the educational mission at issue could
be any of the three most common ones mentioned in Part IV:
prevention of disruption to the educational environment, maintenance
of the credibility of and high regard for the school in speech it
affirmatively sponsors or promotes, and/or inculcation of civility and
387
civic values.
The first educational mission seems to be the university's
argument, since the university president acted to maintain "health,
diligence and order among the students." 388 However, if the argument
is that Baker's story disrupted the educational environment by
offending readers, this is weak since the story appeared only in the
public newsgroup, which readers had to intentionally seek out to find
the story and about which readers should have known something of
the type of content found there. It is unclear that many students at the
university even knew about the story until the media attention began.
However, Baker's story may have constituted a threat toward
another university student, which would be a stronger case for
disruption. Again, this would be a factual issue. However, the story
was not sent to Baker's classmate, and in all likelihood, he probably
thought she would never see it. Baker was not convicted of having
threatened anyone under federal law, and in fact, even the United
States attorney thought it would be difficult to "construe a story as a
threat, particularly when it was clearly labeled as fiction," and

385.
386.
387.
388.

WALLACE & MANGAN, supra note 379, at 67.

See id. at 73.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
WALLACE & MANGAN, supra note 379, at 67.
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dropped that charge.389 Thus, regulation of Baker's behavior is
somewhat removed from preventing disruption to the educational
environment. Given Tinker's demand for articulable bases for fearing
disruption and standards that interference be "material and
substantial," the university would face an uphill battle on this line of
argument.
The university could also claim it acted to protect the name of the
school in punishing Baker. The story bears Baker's name and e-mail
account, listed as "kiasyd@umich.edu," showing that it was sent from
a University of Michigan e-mail account. 390 After all, the reason the
Baker story came to light at all was that it inadvertently found its way
into the hands of Richard DuVal, a University of Michigan
alumnus. 391 DuVal thought the story "crosse[d] the line from bad taste
to pathological '392 and "called the University of Michigan's
President's office to ask why the school's account was disseminating
393
such material.
However, while DuVal seems confused and thought that the
school was "disseminating" such material, the average and reasonable
Internet user would probably not reach that conclusion. 394 Instead, the
average user would understand that the sender (and author of the
story) was at the University of Michigan, a student, faculty member,
or staff person, but that that did not imply the school's endorsement in
any way.
Therefore, the university's punishment of Jake Baker was
probably not a valid regulation of students qua students. Under
standard First Amendment analysis, the school's best bet would have
been to argue that the story was obscene, in which case it receives
little or no First Amendment protection. Obscenity would be a factual
issue, however.

389. Id. at 76. Professor Cass Sunstein refers to the nature of this communication in
specific reference to the Baker case: "At first glance it seems that the question should be
resolved in the same way as any case in which a writer uses a real person's name in fiction
of this sort ....

Perhaps the ease of massive distribution of such materials, which can be

sent to much of the world with the touch of a button, argues in favor of losing the
constitutional constraints .... Sunstein, supra note 79.
390. See Jake Baker Information Page, supranote 35 (reprinting Baker's stories).
391. WALLACE & MANAGAN, supra note 379, at 63. A sixteen year-old came across
the story and showed it to her father, who showed it to Mr. DuVal. Id.
392. Id. at 63 (quoting Richard DuVal).
393. Id.
394.

See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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In sum, the university essentially expelled Baker for publishing a
perverse story, which may very well have violated his First
Amendment rights.
B.

"Die a Slow Death"

In the fall of 1995, a student at Virginia Tech signed on to a
World Wide Web home page for gay men entitled, "Out and
Proud."3 95 He posted a message onto the page that called for gays to
be castrated and to "die a slow death;" additionally, he posted four
pictures of naked women.3 96 The university punished him for violating
a two-year-old university policy prohibiting "use of mail or messaging
397
services to harass, intimidate or otherwise annoy another person,"
although they refused to release the details of the punishment.398
First, there is a formal school regulation here. It prohibited "the
use of mail or messaging services to harass, intimidate or otherwise
annoy another person." 399 While prohibition of harassment or

intimidation is well-ensconced in law and upheld in cases,400 the
"otherwise annoy" language is problematic. A university cannot
proscribe "speech simply because it [is] offensive, even gravely so, by
large numbers of people, 40 1 and annoying is assumably a step below
offensive.
Moreover, a person "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at [the] meaning, 40 2 of "otherwise annoy." There is no
university definition of "language that otherwise annoys another
person," 403 so virtually anything could reasonably be encompassed
within "annoying." An e-mail containing a solicitation or
advertisement could be annoying. A message erroneously addressed,
or repeated such messages, could be annoying to the unwilling
recipient.40 4 The breadth of "annoying" is probably recognized by
395.

Shear, supra note 18, at Al.

396. Id.
397. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
398. Id.
399. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
400. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862-63 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(discussing case precedent on harassing conduct and abusive behavior).
401. Id. at 863.
402. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,607 (1973).
403. Shear, supra note 18. (information from Cathryn'Goree, Dean of Students)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
404. For example, while I was at Stanford, there was another person in the computer
science department who shared my last name "Weng." His friends often tried to mail him
at "weng@cs.stanford.edu," which the computer server thought was me and forwarded to
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other universities, whose regulations mirroring Virginia Tech's here
40 5
do not include the "otherwise annoy" language.
Ignoring for the moment that the regulation suffers from
vagueness and overbreadth, the regulation runs into further problems.
Continuing my approach to analysis, this particular Internet
communication is somewhat hard to characterize without more facts.
It does not quite fit into the "posting" category because it was posted
to someone else's Web page, rather than to a typical newsgroup. It is
unclear whether the Web page invited comments of any sort or
whether the student went out of his way to attach his message to the
page. If the former, the communication is still fairly close to posting to
a public newsgroup as the Web page opened itself to public responses;
the physical analogy might be the student attaching his message and
photos to a flyer praising gay life posted on a public bulletin board. If
the latter, however, the communication is more like a trespass; it could
be analogized to a student defacing a sign on another student's door.
Nor is it clear where the Web page was "located," that is, whether
the Web page belonged to, was run by, or was frequented by other
students at Virginia Tech, and thus housed in a Virginia Tech
computer, or whether the Web page was elsewhere on the Internet.
The answers to these questions might have implications for the effect
of the student's message and photos on disrupting the educational
environment. If the Web page belonged to other Virginia Tech
students or "Out and Proud" was also a Virginia Tech student
organization, there was a question of disruption. If the Web page was
elsewhere on the Internet, the code of conduct under which the
student may have been punished might need to allow for punishing
conduct off of school property.
It seems most likely that the "Out and Proud" site was not
"located" at Virginia Tech nor run by Virginia Tech students. The
newspaper article reporting the incident mentioned that "the student
admitted using the university's computer net, 40 6 and then the site but
did not mention any other students. Also, a search of the Web reveals
me. In fact, they should have been e-mailing him at "weng@leland.stanford.edu," which
was his proper e-mail address. I received messages from his friends fairly often, even
though each time I would reply informing the sender of the mistake. As his friends seemed
unable to grasp their mistake even after I explained it to them, I must admit the messages

became annoying.
405.

Shear, supra note 18, at Al

(describing George Mason University policy

prohibiting students from using "computers to harass, threaten or abuse others" and
University of Maryland policy prohibiting students from harassing others but not banning
"annoying" messages).
406. Id.
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a site entitled "Out and Proud" based in Concord, New Hampshire on
the Bit-Net computer network.4 °7 If this is the same site upon which
the Virginia Tech student intruded, the site has no formal connection
to Virginia Tech or its students whatsoever, although assumably other
Virginia Tech students could feasibly visit it or seek the social contacts
or support available there.40 8 This site does not have a particular
mechanism for publicly posting pictures or messages, although it does
provide buttons to contact "Kirk" or "Jim" for more information,
assumably via personal e-mail.4 °9
This in mind, the educational mission to be furthered by the
regulation could be any of the three most common ones mentioned in
Part IV: prevention of disruption to the educational environment,
maintenance of the credibility of and high regard for the school in
speech it affirmatively sponsors or promotes, and/or inculcation of
410
civility and civic values.
The regulation of the Internet communication here does not have
a direct connection to preventing disruption to the educational
environment. The communication was not aimed at other Virginia
Tech students and did not take place within the campus around other
Virginia Tech students. Given that the Web site was based in
Concord, New Hampshire, it is not particularly likely that any
appreciable number of Virginia Tech students had been logging on to
or participating in the "Out & Proud" Web site. 411 Thus, any effect on
the educational environment would have come from the publicity
afforded the event; that is, somewhat indirectly. The connection being
somewhat tenuous, Virginia Tech would have trouble meeting the
Tinker standards of material and substantial interference and more
than an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension. "412
The maintenance of the credibility of and high regard for the
school name is apparently the educational mission Virginia Tech itself
has put out as justification for the regulation. Cathryn Goree, Dean of
407.

Out & Proud, Men's Group, Concord, New Hampshire (visited October 30, 1997)

<http://www.bit-net.com/-kktek/O%26P.html>.
408. The site notes it is "a social/support group for men exploring their sexuality. We
provide a safe, supportive and confidential place to meet others and discuss issues of

sexuality. You do not have to identify yourself as gay. You don't have to be out (of the
closet)." See id. (emphasis in original).
409.
410.

See id.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.

411. The site seems to be aimed largely toward local participants. For example, it spoke
of the next event being a "Pot Luck supper year-end meeting." See Out & Proud, supra
note 407.
412. 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
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Students, noted that Virginia Tech takes "the position that if you use
our server then you have some responsibilities because you associate
the name of the institution with what you say., 413 However, Virginia
Tech merely provided the server. It did not affirmatively promote or
sponsor the speech. The speech was not remotely part of any
curricular activity. As discussed previously,4 14 an Internet user would
know that the speaker was a student, staff, or faculty member at
Virginia Tech but would not think Virginia Tech endorsed the speech.
Consider that a Virginia Tech student could travel to New
Hampshire, stand up in the middle of a public square, and loudly
declare to all passersby, "I am a Virginia Tech student, and I say fuck
the draft!, 41 5 The student would have associated the name of the
institution with her speech, but it seems unlikely the university would
try to (or be able to) punish the student.
Thus, protection of the name of the school in the name of the
educational mission, in and of itself, is too removed from the
prohibition.
Inculcation of civility and civic values is a more interesting
argument. The school might argue its educational goal was instilling
lessons of "civil, mature conduct," necessitating prohibition of conduct
well out of the bounds of civility and maturity, even well outside the
university setting. This regulation would have a fairly strong
connection to the stated educational mission. However, the school
might receive less judicial deference here. As described earlier, civic
education seems to be more strongly emphasized in secondary and
lower schools than at the university level.41 6 A court would assumably
be more ready to second-guess a school's judgment about the civic
value needed for a twenty-year-old college junior than a secondary or
lower school student. Still, this line of argument might be Virginia
Tech's strongest.
As it seems likely that a school's regulation here is not a valid
regulation of students qua students in furtherance of the educational
mission, standard First Amendment analysis applies. The regulation,
as it is phrased, is not targeted toward a particular viewpoint or
message, so it is content-neutral. Given that the Web site does not
seem to invite posting, per se, the student posting to the Web site is
413. Shear, supra note 18.
414. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
415. "Fuck the draft" alludes to the speech upheld in the Court's decision in Cohen v.
California,403 U.S. 15 (1971).
416. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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probably most like an unsolicited mailing to an individual or
organization, or defacing a sign on the door of that individual or
organization. Forum analysis is not particularly useful here. However,
given the intrusion, the regulation may be allowable. If the student
circumvented the way the Web page worked, that is, broke into the
program that ran the Web page, to post his pictures and message,
certainly this behavior can be prohibited. If not, however, the speech
at issue, while offensive, cannot be generally prohibited.4 17 As one
attorney put it, "This was really bad speech. Well, guess what? That's
418
exactly what is protected by the First Amendment.,
Thus, Virginia Tech was most likely over the constitutional line
here. 4 19 This is not to say schools are completely powerless in such
situations. For starters, the university certainly has almost full latitude
to rescind e-mail privileges for school computer networks, which
would cut off an offender's access to the Internet. It owns the
computer networks and provides the service, and under most
circumstances, it has little obligation to continue to provide the
service. Moreover, at most schools a student agrees to abide by certain
policies when she signs up for and receives a computer account.
However, punishment beyond rescission of Internet privileges in a
case exactly like this runs into constitutional problems.
C. "75 Reasons Why Women Should Not Have Freedom of Speech"
Also in the fall of 1995, four freshmen at Cornell University sent
an e-mail message to about twenty of their friends. 420 The message
listed, "75 reasons why women should not have freedom of speech,"
including such reasons as: "If she can't speak, she can't cry rape"; "Of
course, if she can't speak, she can't say no"; and references to oral
sex. 42 1 The recipients of the message forwarded it along to others, and
the message spread outward, like a chain letter, to people all over the
country. 422 So many people sent e-mails to Cornell complaining about
the message that Cornell's computer system became overloaded and
crashed.4 23 Although the four students made a public apology for the
417. See supra text accompanying note 342.
418. Shear, supra note 18, at Al (quoting Erich Shlachter, a California attorney)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
419. See id. (quoting various authorities and attorneys on their opinions that Virgina
Tech had infringed the First Amendment).
420. See, e.g., E-Mail MischiefGets Cornell in Instant Trouble, supra note 20, at A5.
421. Id.
422. See id.
423. See id.; della Cava et al., supra note 21, at 6D.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[VOL. 20:751

message in Cornell's student newspaper, the university charged the
424
students with sexual harassment and misuse of computer resources.
The university disciplinary board decided not to punish the students
but had them agree to attend a program425on acquaintance rape and
perform fifty hours of community service.
The Internet communication here is a private e-mail message sent
to about twenty people. The most obvious analogy is a letter for which
twenty copies were sent out, via U.S. mail. However, the Internet
makes it very easy to send out twenty copies. A sender need only type
out the twenty e-mail addresses, and the computer does all the
"photocopying" work automatically and instantaneously. Moreover,
each of the twenty recipients can take the message and easily send it
out again, automatically, to everyone she knows, with the touch of a
button.
This is exactly the difficult case broached previously 426 and is
exactly what happened. Each of the twenty recipients did indeed
forward the message along, and in the end, the message found its way
to people all over the country. 427 This makes it unclear whether the
original four authors and senders should be accountable for their
friends forwarding the message along to every eventual recipient.
In this case, however, it seems that the four authors knew or
should have known that the message was likely to be forwarded. In
the first place, they sent it to twenty people, not one or two, which
does not indicate an intent to keep some amount of privacy or control
over the message. Second, the message was essentially a list of jokes,
albeit offensive. To analogize, a person telling a joke to twenty people
reasonably expects some or all of those people to repeat the joke
elsewhere; that is the nature of a joke. Moreover, in the Internet
particularly, numerous humor lists find their way around the country
repeatedly, and it is common practice for friends and e-mail
correspondents to forward these lists to each other. Thus, in this
situation, the four authors should be considered to have performed
the equivalent of posting the message in a public place.
An obvious case for disruption to the educational environment
arises in that the complaints sent to. Cornell in response to the
message overwhelmed the Cornell computer network and caused it to
424. E-Mail Mischief Gets Cornell in Instant Trouble, supra note 20, at A5.
425. della Cava et al., supra note 20, at 6D; see also discussion supra text accompanying
notes 17-18.
426. See discussion supraPart IV.B.
427. See, e.g., E-Mail Mischief Gets Cornell in Instant Trouble, supra note 20, at A5.

1998]

TYPE No EVIL

crash. This of course prevented students and faculty from using the
computer network, for academic or personal use, for the duration of
the crash. However, there is a causation problem in that it may have
not been reasonably foreseeable that the message would be
promulgated to as many recipients as transpired and that so many email complaints would result. In terms of our analytical framework,
the connection between regulating the students' behavior here is not
strongly connected to preventing the computer network from
crashing.
However, the university could also argue the more general
disruption to the educational environment in the public posting or
distributing a message full of misogynistic jokes. Since the nature of
the message suggests the authors should be accountable for the
message being forwarded to its many recipients, the situation is as if
they had written the "75 reasons" down on a posterboard and put it up
in their dormitory or the student union. The "75 reasons" create an
environment hostile to women and less conducive to learning, and in
fact, the university originally charged the authors with sexual
harassment.
While the Tinker standards for disruption to the educational
environment are quite rigorous and probably more forgiving of the
"75 reasons," this case also raises civic education as the educational
goal. This type of message works counter to the civility and citizenship
espoused by civic education. Moreover, Tinker's goal of democratic
education is not particularly served by allowing the public distribution
of "75 reasons why women should not have freedom of speech"; in
fact, the message suggests a reduction of participation by eliminating
women, contravening the ideals of democratic education. Likewise,
the "75 reasons" do not contribute to the pursuit of the truth under
critical education. The list is a series of jokes rather than any type of
intellectual discourse. Thus, while the goals of democratic and critical
education often counterbalance civic education, they do not here.
This would probably lead to factual issues, such as whether the
message did constitute harassment or whether prohibiting the message
is needed to promote civic education. However, Cornell has some
healthy room to argue because the students agreed to the punishment
rather than having it handed down from the disciplinary board. This
avoided a First Amendment battle and was faithful to the educational
goals.
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VI

Conclusion
The Internet is growing by leaps and bounds, and its capabilities
and versatility continue to unfold. The power and speed of
communications on the Internet have the potential to dwarf those of
all other communicative media. Still, the nature of communications on
the Internet is not so fundamentally new or unprecedented to merit
the creation of novel standards for restricting expression. Accordingly,
existing First Amendment doctrines should govern restrictions on
Internet expression.
Even under the existing First Amendment jurisprudence, public
schools should press harder to understand the nature of the Internet
before blundering forward. The Internet has engendered a whole new
set of social practices and social norms. Regulating student Internet
usage is not inherently and instantaneously a regulation of students
qua students; schools must still show the regulation's purpose and its
link to furthering the educational mission.
Where schools treat Internet communications as fundamentally
different than all other communications and discipline expression
almost at will, they overstep the bounds of First Amendment
protections. Rather, they should draft clear policies on Internet usage
that distinguish different types of Internet expression. Just as they
would treat an offensive statement made by a person in her dormitory
bedroom different than the same statement being yelled out in the
middle of a classroom during a lecture or in an administrative office,
they should differentiate types of Internet expression. And, of course,
they must avoid restrictions that violate the First Amendment
freedom of speech.
Professor Laurence Tribe writes:
The Constitution's architecture can too easily come to seem quaint,
irrelevant, or at least impossible to take very seriously, in the world
as reconstituted by the microchip ....

[But] the Framers of our

Constitution were very wise indeed. They bequeathed us a
framework for all seasons, a truly astonishing document whose
principles are suitable for all times and all technological
landscapes.

428

Educational institutions (and courts) should take note.

428. Tribe, supra note 272.

